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ARTICLES
Deference Running Rfot: Separating Interpretation and
Lawmaking Under Chevron
MICHAEL HERZ*

The Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC is
only eight years old, yet it ha.s become perhaps the central case of modern administrative law. It is cited with extraordinary frequency,2 seems
actually to be affecting lower court decisions 3 (perhaps too much so),
and has provoked intense debate over its meaning and correctness. 4
Chevron receives so much attention because it implicates the basic
problems concerning the institutional roles of the different players in
the administrative state. It is the decision in which the different ages of
administrative law meet; the quasi-constitutional, structural issues that
preoccupied early administrative law appear in the context of the

*

Associate Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
A mid-January 1992 Lexis search of Shepard's Citations shows over 2000 citato Chevron in the federal courts.
Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1028-43, 1058-59. Chevron's effect on the Supreme Court has been inconsistent. Although the Court has taken
Chevron seriously in occasional cases, overall it has shown no greater acceptance of
agency interpretations than it had prior to that decision. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980-93 (l 992).
4. The large and growing literature on Chevron falls into two basic camps: those
who read it broadly and are pleased by its overall message of deference, and those who
read it narrowly and are troubled by that message. The former includes, among others,
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 505-06, 520-24 (1985); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; and Kenneth W.
Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (1986). The
latter includes, among others, Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the
Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 CO LUM. L. REV. 452 ( 1989), and
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421
(1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Constitutionalism]. Professor Suristein's condemnation of
Chevron has recently become a good deal less fierce. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein,
law and Administration].
I.
2.
tions
3.
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quasi-procedural, judicial oversight issues that have preoccupied later
administrative law.
For a century now, the courts have st'ruggled to determine the limits,
if any, on what governmental tasks can be handed over to administrative agencies. The Supreme Court has rarely held that those limits have
been exceeded. In particular, apart from an occasional deviation," the
Court has consistently upheld delegations of legislative authority. 6 We
are well past the point of serious constitutional challenges to broad
delegations. What was once decried as "delegation running riot" 7 has
long been accepted as the proper, or at least inevitable, functioning of
the modern administrative state. 8
In some ways Chevron is the Court's most honest decision about legislative delegation, for it frankly recognizes that Congress does hand
over largely unfettered policy-making authority to agencies. 9 In the
name of democracy, 10 it forbids judicial interference with an agency's
exercise of delegated authority to fill gaps left by Congress. 11 Chevron
thus accepts the legitimacy of broad congressional delegation, and
warns the courts that the delegation is not to them but to the demo5. See A.LA. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to President under National Industrial Recovery Act); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (holding unconstitutional standardless delegation to President of power to interdict transportation
of petroleum).
6. See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding delegation of power to establish criminal sentences to United States Sentencing
Commission).
7. A.LA. Schecter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
8. See American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1947) (stating that
judicial acceptance of vague delegations is "a reflection of the necessities of modern
legislation dealing with complex economic and social problems").
9. The links between Chevron and nondelegation are explored in Douglas W.
Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269 (1988).
10. Many of the Court's recent decisions purport to advance the principle of democratic government. For a critical review of the Court's "majoritarian paradigm," under
which the judiciary's essential task is to get out of the way of legislative majorities, see
Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43
(1989).
11. Chevron divides review of agency statutory construction into two steps. "First,
always, is the question of whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter." Chevron, 467
U.S. at 842. Where "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. Thus, where Congress "has explicitly left a gap for
the agency to fill, ... [s]uch legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 843. Even
where the gap is implicit, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. Id.
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cratically acco.untable agencies. The substantial controversy surrounding Chevron concerns whether the decision does more than delegate
power to the agencies. Its detractors portray Chevron as itself a delegation, one that abandons to administrative agencies the judicial authority and obligation to "say what the law is."
In this Article I argue that both sides in the Chevron debate overstate their case. Although my sympathies are with those who think
Chevron goes too far, the opinion's basic conclusions are sound and
must be taken seriously. On the other hand, courts too often carry deference beyond its appropriate boundaries. Delegation inay have run
riot, but deference should not, even in the name of respect for such
delegations. .
·
Chevron creates two related risks that must inform its application.
First, while Chevron presupposes and endorses broad legislative delegations, it also undercuts their legitimacy. Historically, the acceptance of
broad delegations has rested in part on the assumption that agency action is subject to meaningful judicial review. 12 To the extent Chevron is
interpreted as letting the agency itself determine the consistency of its
action with the terms of the delegation, it destroys this premise. Second, while, as Chevron emphasizes, agencies have.an edge on courts in
accountability, they have no such edge on Congress. 13 To the contrary,
12. See, e.g., Touby v. United States,_ U.S.-, 111 S. Ct. 1752, 1758 (1991)
(Marshall, J., concurring); Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218
(1989); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1947); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 42-46 (1932);
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971)
(permitting delegations under "a principle of accountability under which the compatibility with the legislative design may be ascertained not only by Congress but by the
courts and the public"); PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 219 (1989); Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and
Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 585-86 (1985).
13. Emphasis on accountability as a characteristic of administrative agencies is a
relatively recent phenomenon. Agency officials are, of course, unelected. Oversight by
the elected head of the executive branch is necessarily incomplete, and in certain perverse ways actually may reduce accountability. Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential
Control of Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 456-57 (1987). Accordingly, one of the primary objections to delegations of legislative authority is the lack of
accountability of appointed officials. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (positing
that first function of nondelegation doctrine is io "ensure[] ... that important choices
of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive
to the popular will"); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-134 (1980)
(arguing for reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine to ensure that policy is made by
elected officials); CHRISTOPHER FOREMAN, SIGNALS FROM THE HILL 2 (1988) (emphasizing need for congressional oversight); Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0.
Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982) (arguing
for renewed nondelegation doctrine in order to prevent legislature from shifting its re-
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g1vmg agencies too free a hand trenches on congressional authority,
thereby reducing accountability. 14 To the extent Congress has in fact
decided something, Chevron's own political theory requires the courts
to ensure that agencies act consistently with that decision.
The received lesson of Chevron-if the statute is unclear, uphold the
agency unless the action is unreasonable-reflects insufficient awareness of these risks. The basic error is a failure to distinguish agency
interpretation, in a narrow sense, from agency lawmaking. Chevron
does not make agency "interpretations" of statutes binding on the
courts; it does require acceptance of agency lawmaking. Chevron is understood best in light of the longstanding, if OV\!rsimple, distinction between legislative and interpretive rules. Part I discusses this distinction
and its application. Part II argues that the distinction remains alive
and well, and that Chevron does not make agency interpretations in
this strict sense binding, even where the statute is unclear. Part III
addresses a ·series of simmering controversies about the scope of deference in light of the understanding of Chevron developed in Parts I and
II.

I.

INTERPRETATION VERSUS LEGISLATION

Separating interpretation from lawmaking is both easy and impossible. The two ought to be different: lawmaking is the process of devising
and promulgating the rules; interpretation involves figuring out just
what the rules mean, .often as applied to particular circumstances. Yet
under almost any theory of statutory interpretation, 15 the two overlap.
"Interpret_ation"-at least in any case where a statute is sufficiently
unclear as to require judicial explication-must involve some extra-textual clues, even if merely "common sense" or the rules of grammar, as
sponsibilities to agencies). Cf Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged v. Mathews,
590 F.2d 1250, 1257 (3d Cir. 1978) (explaining that courts are more skeptical of retroactive agency decisions than of retroactive legislation because "[t]he constitutional legitimacy that inheres in Congress by virtue of its accountability to the electorate is
absent" with regard to agencies, who "are not, as a practical matter, accountable to
anyone and whose decisions are immune from challenge"). That concern should not be
forgotten as a result of Chevron's false, or at least incomplete, dichotomy of judges
versus agencies.
•
14. Or at least that is the theory of our Constitution. Whether it squares with political reality is a more difficult question. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 81, 95-99 (1985)
(arguing that agencies are more accountable than Congress).
15. Recent years have seen an explosion of such theories. For a brief catalogue, see
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Sca/ia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1614-15 (1991).
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to the "better" of two or more possible readings. 16 It also is likely to
involve the application of statutory language to unanticipated situations, which will require elements of "lawmaking" as just defined. 17
Despite pleas for judges who will "interpret and not make the law," 18
they do not really exist.
Nonetheless, administrative law doctrine insists that the two tasks
are different, hence the distinction between legislative and interpretive
rules. This distinction helps define the appropriate limits of Chevron.

A.

Interpretive and Legislative Rules

The black-letter principles are easily stated. A legislative, or substantive, 19 rule has the "force and effec~ of law." 20 The rule itself is the
"primary source of legal obligation," 21 creating new law, rights, or duties.22 An interpretive rule, in contrast, merely states the agency's view
16. STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980); Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 739 (1982); Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conflict,
Indeterminacy and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism, I I CARDOZO L.
REV. 1211 (1990).
17. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Inteht and Public Choice, 74
VA. L. REV. 423, 457-58 (1988).
18. In announcing his nomination of Justice Souter, for example, President Bush
assured an anxious nation that the nominee "is committed to interpreting, not making
the law." Comments by President On His Choice of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
1990, at A18, col. 1. In the ensuing question and answer period, he reiterated six separate times that he had sought and was confident he had found a nominee who would
"interpret the Constitution" rather than "legislate from the bench." Id. President Bush
was following a long tradition. See HENRY JULIAN ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 4 (1976) (describing similar assurances by President Nixon on nominating Chief
Justice Burger). See also American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith,_ U.S._, 110 S. Ct.
2323, 2343 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that "the judicial role ... is to say
what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be"); The Federalist Society (3d unnumbered page) (describing Federalist Society as founded on principle that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, not what it should
be").
19. The two terms are generally used interchangeably. See Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (referring to "a substantive rule-or a 'legislativetype' rule"); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) · (referring to
"[l]egislative, or substantive, regulations"); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 180-81 (3d ed. 1991); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30, n.3 (1947) (using term "substantive rules"). I will stick with "legislative." See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:9, at 45-48 (2d ed. 1979) (stating that "legislative rules" is
preferable term because "substantive" means "nonprocedural").
20. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,. 425 n.9 (1977); Paul v. United States, 371
U.S. 245, 255 (1963); Smith v. Russelville Prod. Credit Ass'n, 777 F.2d 1544, 1548
(11th Cir. 1985); WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 151
(1986); SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 181.
21. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 599, 613 (2d Cir. 1979).
22. General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
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of what the statute already requires. 23 The statute remains the basis for
any legal obligations or the imposition of liability, and the rule only
clarifies or draws attention to the statutory requirements. 24 This distinction is not crystal clear,2 e1 and often evaporates in the application;
nevertheless, it is conceptually coherent and doctrinally entrenched.
A second, slightly less common, line is sometimes drawn between
·legislative and interpretive rules; only legislative rules are adopted pursuant to a specific delegation of rulemaking authority. 26 Thus, an
agency rule that fleshes out a statutory term establishing legal obligations, which is interpretive under the approach outlined above, is legislative if Congress has specifically instructed the agency to issue such
rules, even though, for example, the agency could bring an enforcement
action with or without promulgating the rule. Perhaps the best-known
such case is Batterton v. Francis. 27 In Batterton, the statute specifically
instruct.ed the agency to issue standards that would further define the
statutory term, "unemployment." The Court treated these rules as legislative even though issuance of the rules was unnecessary to the operation of the statute. 28 Batterton has been criticized as blurring the distinction between legislative and interpretive rules. 29 Certainly the type
of rule to which it accords legislative effect often will be interpretive in
the sense of explaining or clarifying statutory rights or duties. By virtue
of the congressional delegation, however, such rules have the force of
law so they are legislative rules.
Whether a rule is legislative or interpretive matters for two reasons.
First, the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) do not apply to interpretive rules. 30 Second, and
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 {1985).
23. id.
24. Friedrich v. Secretary of HHS, 894 F.2d 829, 834 (6th Cir. 1990); Board of
Educ. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 599, 613 (2d Cir. 1979).
25. The District of Columbia Circuit has described it as "enshrouded in considerable smog." Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d at 1565. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v.
Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 696 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that "attempts to draw a hard
and fast tine between 'interpretive' and 'substantive' regulations have been rather
unrewarding").
26. K.C. Davis is the leading exponent of this view. 2 DAVIS, supra note 19, at
§ 7:8.
27. 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
28. Id. at 425. The same approach occurs in, among other cases, United States v.
Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 466 {1983);
Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1982); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., 322
U.S. 607 (1944); Wint v. Yeutter, 902 F.2d 76, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
29. Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis
and a Proposal for Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 353 ..
30. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A), (d)(2) {1988).
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more important for present purposes, interpretive rules receive "less
deference" on judicial review; 31 unlike legislative rules, they are not
"binding." 32 Interpretive rules are, in the oft-quoted passage from Justice Jackson's opinion in Skidmore, 33 "not controlling upon the courts,"
although they "do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." 34
The respect owed by a court to such an interpretation "will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all of those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control." 35 Thus, "[a]lthough nonlegislative rules have no binding
force, they are usually given considerable deference." 36 In contrast, legislative rules bind not only the regulated community and the agency
itself, but the courts as well. 37 A reviewing court can set aside a legislative rule only if it exceeds the agency's statutory authority or is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law. 38 In other words, courts scrutinize legislative rules under the
Chevron step two approach. 39
B.

The Scope of Defe,:ence

Its defects notwithstanding, the traditional interpretive/legislative
distinction is the best guide through the Chevron thicket. It separates
two different, if occasionally overlapping, determinations: what an
agency thinks Congress decided, on the one hand, and what an agency
would decide on its own, on the other. There are sound reasons why an
agency's interpretive determinations (its conclusion as to statutory
meaning) should not be binding, but its legislative, or policy-based, determinations should be binding.
31. Frank Diehl Farms v. Secretary, 696 F.2d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 1983).
32. Seneca Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 712 F.2d 1384, 1396 (Temp. Emerg.
Ct. App. 1983); Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1154 n.26
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
33. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
34 Id. at 140.
35. Id.; see Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) ("By way of contrast [to judicial treatment of legislative rules], a court is not required to give effect to
an interpretative regulation.").
36. CHARLES H. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE § 3.53, at 93 (1990
Supp.); see 2 DAVIS, supra note 19, at§ 7:13 (discussing deference given to interpretive
rules by courts).
37. 2 DAVIS, supra note 19, § 7:10, at 52.
38. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977).
39. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing Chevron's two-step approach to reviewing agency statutory construction).
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Why Defer?

To understand why interpretations should not be binding, it is necessary to consider the basic justifications for judicial deference to agencies.40 The justifications fall into two broad categories, reflecting the
different ways in which an agency may have a comparative advantage
over a court in dealing with a statute. First, the agency's proximity to
the legislative process may give it special insight into congressional intent.41 Second, the agency's expertise and political accountability may
make it a preferable body for the formulation of policy. 42 These two
advantages argue for different kinds of review.
The most obvious explanation for deference to agency interpretations
would be that the agency is better able to understand the statute than
is the court. The agency may have helped draft the statute;43 it may
possess an institutional memory about the statute's history and true
meaning; it is better informed of Congress' current views; and, in light
of its technical expertise and complete familiarity with the statute,44 it
can determine the interpretation that will be most workable in practice
and best advance the statute's overall goals. 45 In these ways, the agency
interpretation can be trusted to comport with congressional will and
statutory purposes, which the agency understands better than the court.
Although this justification for deference has a lengthy pedigree, it is
not the theory that underlies Chevron. In Chevron, the Court deferred
not because it deemed the agency to have a superior understanding of
the statute, but because there was nothing to understand. Congress had
left a "gap" for the agency to fill, thereby implicitly instructing the
courts to accept the agency's decision. 46 Chevron assumes that Con40. Similar summaries of the justifications for deference can be found in, among
other sources, STRAUSS, supra note 12, at 253-56, and Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 AoMIN. L. REV. 363, 367-69 (1986).
41. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (explaining reasons for deference
to agency interpretations).
·
42. See infra notes 46-49, 56 and accompanying text (detailing Chevron's justification for deference).
43. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 144 (1979) (confirming that "[a]dministrative interpretations are especially persuasive where, as here, the agency participated
in developing the provision"); Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 315 (1943) (upholding agencies' interpretation because agencies "cooperated in developing the Act,
and their views are entitled to great weight in its interpretation"); United States v.
American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940) ("[T]he Commission's interpretation gains much persuasiveness from the fact that it was the Commission which suggested the provisions' enactment to Congress.").
44. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
45. Breyer, supra note 40, at 368.
46. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
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gress does not know exactly what it wants but trusts the agency. 47
Under this now common view of the theoretical underpinning of judicial deference, 48 the need for and extent of deference is a function of
congressional intent. 49
The notion that Congress has delegated interpretive authority to the
agency is likely to be wholly fictional in any case where the delegation
is not express. The rivalry between the legislative and executive
branches, compounded by the now longstanding phenomenon of powers
separated not only by the Constitution but by political party, should
raise doubts that Congress actually wants to hand over power to the
agencies. 5 ° Congress should prefer relatively stringent judicial review of
agency interpretations. 51 Chevron's presumption is particularly
47. Breyer, supra note 40, at 369-71.
48. See, e.g., Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,_ U.S _, 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2534
(1991) ("When Congress, through express delegation or the introduction of an interpretive gap in the statutory structure, has delegated policy making authority to an
administrative agency, the extent of judicial review of the agency's policy determination is limited."); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett,_ U.S.-, 110 S. Ct. 1384, 1390-91
(1990) (" A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of
administrative authority."); Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 411
(7th Cir. 1987) ("If the legislation either calls for the agency's decision or contains no
disposition of the subject, then the agency has been deputized to make a rule, and its
decision should be respected."); STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 285-86 (2d ed. 1985); Robert A.
Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and Courts?, 7 YALE J.
ON REG., 1 (1990); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative
State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 570 (1985); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the
Administrative State, 83 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 31 n.184 (1983); Scalia, supra note 4, at
516-17.
One other justification for deference bears mention. Because federal agencies have a
nationwide jurisdiction and federal courts •Of appeals do not, greater judicial deference
will lend uniformity to federal law. Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Po/icy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 824 (1990); Peter L. Strauss, One

Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited
Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121-22
(1987). This justification has nothing to do with whether the agency's view is "correct";
it merely reflects that the easiest way to achieve uniformity is for the 800 federal
judges to agree to go along with the one agency.
49. See Process Gas Consumers Group v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 694
F.2d 778, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en bane) (explaining that "[t]he extent to which
courts should defer to agency interpretations of law is ultimately 'a function of Congress' intent on the subject as revealed in the particular statutory scheme at issue' "
(quoting Constance v. Secretary of HHS, 672 F.2d 990, 995 (1st Cir. 1982))).
50. Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the
Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1213 (1990). See 5
U.S.C. § 706 (1988) (requiring that in reviewing agency action "court shall decide all
relevant questions of law ... [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions")
(emphases added).
51. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 3, at 1026 (arguing that "[i]f courts are suspicious of agency power, their mistrust only mirrors that of members of Congress and the
general public"); id. at 1027 (noting Congress' preference for judicial review with
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counterfactual in equating ambiguity with delegation. 62 Statutory ambiguity results primarily from time constraints, logrolling, and individual legislator's desire for credit but not blame. As Justice Stevens was.
fully aware, it is not necessarily the result of a conscious desire of Congress to leave policy-making to the agency. 63 The Court nonetheless
indulged the fiction because of its belief in the democratic accountability of agencies. Judges "are not part of either political branch" 64 and
"have no constituency";66 therefore they should yield to agencies' resolution of the policy questions that Congress left undecided. 66

2.

Deference to What?

The foregoing rationales justify deference to two very different types
of agency conclusions. Although the term "interpretation" is applied to
both, they roughly correspond to the interpretive rule/legislative rule
distinction. The first rationale-agencies' superior understanding of
statutory meaning-concerns "interpretation" in a strict sense; the elucidation or. translation of a statutory term. The agency is in a particularly good position to determine what Congress meant. That is the sort
of conclusion set out in interpretive rules. In contrast, the second justification-agencies' superior accountability and· political legitimacy-is
not so· much about "interpretation" as it is about lawmaking. The
agency is in a particularly good position to determine not what rule
Congress prescribed but which rule is best. Chevron deference does not
reflect the agency's ability to determine the one correct meaning of a
statute. Rather, its premise is that no such thing exists. The agency is
teeth).
52. Farina, supra note 4, at 468-76; Michael Herz, Textua!ism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1666-68
(1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 407, 445 ( 1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting] (objecting that "an ambiguity is simply not a delegation of law-interpreting power. Chevron confuses the two.").
53. Justice Stevens did not claim_ that Congress consciously desired to let the
agency answer the hard questions; his point was that, whatever the explanation, that is
what Congress had done:
Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at
this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps
it simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was
unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side
decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency. For judicial
purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
54. Id. at 865.
55. Id. at 866.
56. Id.
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not clarifying Congress' decision, it is making the decision itself.
Whether by congressional direction, superior accountability, or technical expertise, such lawmaking, holds Chevron, must be left to the
agency. 57
The difference is illustrated by the still hardy principle that a longstanding agency "interpretation" is due particular deference. 58 Such
enhanced deference is justified primarily on the ground that Congress'
apparent acceptance of the interpretation over the years shows that the
agency is "correct." 59 Accordingly, deference is heightened even further if Congress has amended the relevant or a related statute but left
the portion at issue unchanged 60 or if the interpretation dates from the
statute's enactment, when the agency supposedly was most aware of
what Congress had in mind. 61 The particular authority of the unwavering interpretation thus lies in its consistency with congressional intent. 62
.

.

57. The national uniformity justification is of the .second type; it has nothing to do
with whether the agency interpretation is "correct." Nonetheless, it justifies no more
than the deference historically accorded interpretive rules. First, a lack of national uniformity, which is tolerated in a wide variety of settings, is simply no_t a sufficiently
compelling reason to abandon the traditional and necessary role of the courts in insisting that agencies adhere to Congress' decisions. Second, if national uniformity is the
goal, that can be achieved equally well by having any subsequent court defer to the
first court to decide an issue, an approach no more inconsistent with traditional assumptions than having it defer to the agency. Third, national uniformity will still be
promoted, though not guaranteed, by the courts granting Skidmore deference to
agency interpretations. Finally, the geographical uniformity produced by Chevron is
offset by a loss of temporal and interagency uniformity. The freedom agencies enjoy
under Chevron to change their views, see infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text, will
lead to inconsistency over time and between agencies with costs that may be significant.
See Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in
the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 817-20 (1991) (describing inconsistencies
in diverse agencies' implementation of similar statutory schemes).
58. See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981)
(observing that "construction deserves special deference when it has remained constant
over a long period of time"); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450
(1978) (commenting that "longstanding and consistent administrative interpretation is
entitled to considerable weight").
' 59. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States~ 461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983) (remarking that since Congress has corrected misconstructions of statutes by agencies in
past, its failure to modify Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rulings of which it was definitely aware "leave[s] no doubt that the IRS reached the correct conclusion in exercising its authority"); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1969)
(deferring because Congress refused to alter FCC's fairness doctrine for thirty years
and then explicitly acknowledged it in statutory amendment).
60. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 300-01 (1981); Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 53 (1955).
61. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 120
(1980); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 533 (1978); National Treasury Employees Union v. United States Merit Protection Bd., 743 F.2d 895, 917 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
62. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974) (observing that "con-
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In contrast, if Congress has turned over the policy-making task to the
agency, then an ancient "interpretation" should carry virtually the
same weight as the most recent of a series of agency reversals. 63 Indeed, a constantly shifting policy may indicate that the agency is doing
its job, reflecting the expertise, accountability, and flexibility that justified placing the decision in its hands. The regulation challenged in
Chevron was itself a Reagan administration reversal of the positi<;m
taken by the Carter Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that
many would justify in these terms. 64 The important point is that because in such circumstances the agency's view is not in fact an "interpretation" of a statute, its vintage is irrelevant to its validity.
Although courts, including the Supreme Court, still reflexively recite
the principle that longstanding interpretations deserve special deference,615 Chevron clearly reflects the second of these approaches. 66 The
gressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's [longstanding] interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress") (emphasis
added). Thus, Judge Posner, operating from the premise that the interpretive task is to
determine the enacting legislature's intent, argues that courts should defer only to longstanding interpretations. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 280 (1985).
63. I say "virtually" because deference to a longstanding interpretation can also be
justified on the ground that reversal will upset settled expectations. This has nothing to
do with the interpretation's consistency with congressional intent. Rather, an unsupported change in policy may so harm reliance interests as to render the change arbitrary and capricious, part of the Chevron step two inquiry. Similarly, a shift occurring
without any explanation would not be upheld. For example, the air bags case, Motor
Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), involved
no question of interpretation whatsoever; the matter of pure policy was in the hands of
the agency. Nonetheless, an unjustified shift doomed the agency action. Cf Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that
secondary retroactive impact of formally prospective regulation may be so severe as to
render regulation arbitrary and capricious).
64. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
65. See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., _ U.S. - , 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2535
(1991) (stating that Department of Labor's interpretation pursuant to express congres.sional delegation would merit less deference had it been inconsistent with previously
held views); Aulston v. United States, 915 F.2d 584, 596 (10th Cir. 1990) (explaining
that great deference is given to consistent and longstanding agency interpretations);
Commonwealth of Mass. v. Secretary of HHS, 899 F.2d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating
that less deference is due to an agency's position that is inconsistent with a prior consistently held agency view).
Invocation of this principle is not always reflexive. The Third Circuit, for example,
recently came to the considered and express conclusion that examination of agency
consistency is part of the step two inquiry. NLRB v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 936
F.2d 144, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1991). This holding is flatly wrong. See infra note 66 and
accompanying text (discussing deference to longstanding interpretations).
66. "Chevron made crystal clear that an agency interpreting a statute under an
express or implied delegation of authority is free to modify its view." Federal Labor
Relations Authority v. Department of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446,. 1455 (D.C. Cir.
1989). Accord Rust v. Sullivan,_ U.S._, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1769 (1991) (stating
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opm1on rests on the premise that Congress did not decide whether a
plant-wide bubble could render new source requirements inapplicable.
Rather, Congress created what Peter Strauss has labeled a "zone of
indeterminacy," 67 in which the agency was free to do what it wanted as
long as it did not go off the deep end. Judicial review of the bubble
policy had nothing to do with a determination of congressional intent;
there was no intent to determine. Chevron is about legislative rather
than interpretive rules.
What "binds" a court, then, under both the traditional interpretive/
legislative rule distinction and under Chevron, is not agency interpretation but agency legislation-the adoption of a particular policy within
the boundaries established by the statute. 68 So viewed, Chevron imposes exactly the scheme Professor Monaghan had set out the year
before. 69 Monaghan argued that in light of Congress' broad legislative
delegations the judicial function is only to determine what authority
has been conferred upon the agency. "Judicial deference to agency 'interpretation' of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of
law making authority to an agency." 70 Where an agency acts pursuant
to delegated legislative authority, the task of interpretation is merely to
define the boundaries of the zone of indeterminacy.
that as long as agency supports new interpretation with "reasoned analysis," even sharp
break from prior position merits full Chevron deference); Starr, supra note 4, at 29798; Strauss, supra note 48, at 1125-26.
,
The same idea underlies the courts' appropriate willingness to accept conflicting
agency interpretations of the same term in different sections of the same statute. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Comite Pro Rescate v. Sewer
Auth., 888 F.2d 180, 187 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied,_ U.S.-, 110 S. Ct. 1476
(1990).
67. Strauss, supra note 48, at 1124. See id. at 1121 {using phrase "range of indeterminacy"); id, at 1123 (using phrase "area of indeterminacy"),
68. Concededly, the Chevron opinion refers repeatedly to "an agency's construction
of the statute," "an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme," and
"deference to administrative interpretations," concluding that "the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests
and is entitled to deference." Chevron, 467 U,S. at 842, 844, 865 (emphasis added).
These references to "interpretation" and "construction" reflect a different usage than
mine, not a different meaning. The structure and basic rationale of the opinion indicate
that the Court is deferring not to the agency's reading of the Clean Air Act, but to its
lawmaking pursuant to congressional delegation. Thus, the Court pescribes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as "an agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities," Id. at 865, The Court concludes "that the EPA's use of
the bubble concept is a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make." Id. at 845.
The lawsuit, "fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy." Id. at 866. The Court's emphasis on democratic theory and ,the inappropriateness
of judicial policy-making underlines its view that the case presented no issue of statutory construction but merely a policy choice. Id,
69. Monaghan, supra note 48.
70. Id. at 26.
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Consider the purest examples of legislative rules: health, safety, or
environmental standards. For example, under the Clean Air Act, EPA
establishes national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for certain ubiquitous air pollutants. 71 These are legislative rules by any definition; they create binding legal duties where none had existed before
and are promulgated pursuant to express congressional delegation. A
"primary" NAAQS must be set at the level that ensures, with an adequate margin of safety, protection of the public health. 72 Armed with
this delegation, EPA promulgated an ambient standard for ozone of
0.12 parts per million (ppm). 73 Industrial and environmental interests
both sought judicial review, the former saying the number was too low,
the latter that it was too high. The court reviewed the standard to determine whether it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law. Not surprisingly, it upheld the
regulation. 74
Although the vocabulary seems incongruous, this was a. classic Chevron step two case. Congress expressly delegated legislative authority to
EPA; the zone of indeterminacy is defined by statutory language requiring protection of the public health. The 0.12 ppm standard is acceptable, but given the scope of the delegation and the uncertainty of
the science a court also would have upheld a standard half or twice the
one EPA promulgated. The bubble policy, or any other agency determination properly evaluated under Chevron step two, is just like the
NAAQS-a legislative, policy-based decision that binds the courts,
whose only function is to ensure that the rule is within the scope of the
delegated authority and not arbitrary. The scope of review is narrow
not because the court must accept the agency's interpretation, but because there is so little to interpret.

3.

Binding Interpretations

Chevron is silent as to how a court should treat an agency's interpretation of Congress' decision. As discussed in Part II.B, such an interpretation should be, as interpretive rules always have been, influential
but not binding. 75 Suppose, however, that Congress·expressly has given
71. 42 u.s.c. § 7409 (1988).
72. Id. § 7409(b)(l).
73. 44 Fed. Reg. 8202 (1979), codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.9 (1991).
74. American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(upholding standards because they were not arbitrary and capricious and were "supported by a rational basis in the record"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1034 (1982).
75. As the Court said only the term before, "[w]hen an agency's decision is premised on its understanding of a specific congressional intent ... it engages in the
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an agency binding interpretive authority. Here, step two is appropriate.76 Such cases involve legislative rules; the agency functions under
an express delegation to promulgate binding regulations with the force
of law even though they may be interpretations in the strict sense of
expressing a congressional decision. 77
Congress does have the authority to grant agencies such interpretive
authority. The courts' traditional role is indisputably reduced where the
agency rather than the court makes a conclusive determination of statutory meaning. However, this does not amount to an unconstitutional
creation of Article II courts 78 or a contraction of the federal "arisingunder" jurisdiction. 79 Nor is this an unconstitutional delegation. It is
true that in such circumstances not only does Congress hand over legislative authority to an agency guided by only the vaguest "intelligible
principle," 80 but the agency itself determines what that principle is. 81
quintessential judicial function of deciding what a statute means. In that case, the
agency's interpretation, particularly to the extent it rests on factual premises within its
expertise, may be influential, but it cannot bind a court." Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
& Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 98 n.8 (1983). Nothing in
Chevron is to the contrary.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984) (holding that
because "Congress explicitly delegated authority to construe the statute by regulation,
in this case we must give the regulations legislative and hence controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or plainly contrary to the statute"); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 466 (1983) (holding that Secretary of Health and Human Services
has authority to establish administrative guidelines for determination of total disability
and judicial review "is limited to determining whether the regulations promulgated ...
are arbitrary and capricious"); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981)
(limiting review of regulation to reasonableness standard because of express delegation); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977) (holding that where Congress
has expressly delegated to agency authority to prescribe by regulation what constitutes
"unemployment" under statute, courts can set aside regulations only if they exceed
agency's authority or are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion).
77. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between
legislative and interpretive rules).
78. The argument would be that the judicial function, saying what the law is, is
being handed over to the agency, which renders binding, final rulings.
79. In a sense, for Congress to grant binding interpretive authority to agencies
removes certain federal questions from judicial purview. This argument fails for two
reasons. First, Congress can, to a much-debated extent, define the federal judicial
power more narrowly than does Article III. See generally Kevin T. Worthen, Shedding
New Light on an Old Debate: A Federal Indian Law Perspective on Congressional
Authority to Limit Federal Jurisdiction, 75 MINN. L. REV. 65, 69-81 (1990) (discussing theories under which Congress may restrict federal courts' jurisdiction). Second, a
court's determination that the statute makes the agency interpretation dispositive is
itself an exercise of the "arising-under" jurisdiction.
80. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
81. The possible unconstitutionality of this lack of congressional control depends on
one's view of the core problem with standardless delegations. If the problem is that
Congress must make the decisions, then it is highly questionable to allow an agency to
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Yet here a greater-includes-the-lesser argument, usually problematic
with regard to separation of powers, 82 is perfectly valid. If Congress
can hand over legislative authority altogether, it surely can make an
initial attempt at legislation and then assign an agency the task of fig:uring out what it did, subject to judicial review to ensure that the
agency's conclusion is "permissible. " 83
Although Congress can grant and has granted such interpretive authority to agencies, there is no justification for establishing a background or default rule to that effect. It is one thing to say, as Chevron
does, that Congress implicitly delegates to agencies the authority to
make policy-based rules within statutorily defined limits, although even
that is a bit of a stretch. 84 But it is perverse to assume that Congress
also gives agencies binding authority to determine what it is that Congress has done. Not only is such an idea inconsistent with the traditional roles of courts, Congress, and agencies, it also undercuts Congress' assumption that its action~ will control unless and until a
subsequent Congress makes changes. Laws survive the political coalitions that produced them; the legitimacy of a statute does not depend
on current public or congressional opinion. 85 Under the accountability
rationale of Chevron, this is a reason for placing primary interpretive
authority with the courts rather than with the agencies. The political
determine the limits on its own authority. If, on the other hand, the concern is that
agencies not act with complete discretion in individual cases, then the agency can adequately tie its own hands through rulemaking and the nondelegation problem is not
increased.
82. Cf Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986) (rejecting argument that
because Congress creates and can eliminate executive branch offices it can remove officeholders);· INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953-54 (1983) (rejecting argument that,
because Congress can hand over decision to Attorney General entirely, it can hand it
over subject to legislative veto); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-39 (1976) (concluding that Congress' power to create and eliminate executive branch offices does not
mean that Congress can appoint officeholders).
83. A recent article argues that Chevron's grant of binding interpretive authority to
agencies is unconstitutional. See Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 57. For the reasons I
have sketched out, I disagree, although the argument deserves fuller treatment than I
have given it. It bears emphasis, however, that the constitutionality of Chevron deference is even open to question only in this setting, i.e., where the agency is interpreting
rather than legislating. A true gap-filling, legislative, step-two setting raises no concerns about encroachment of judicial authority, but only a garden-variety nondelegation issue. Professor Caust-Ellenbogen and I would agree, I think, that courts are often
too quick to consider cases under step two when they really do present an interpretive
question for judicial resolution.
84. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why Congress should prefer stringent judicial review of agency interpretations).
85. See Daniel A. Farber, Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 308-09 (1989)
(arguing that even radical changes in public opinion do not justify deviations from
statutory directives).
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result reflected in the statute more likely will be respected by neutral
courts than. by · accountable, politically appointed agencies. Congressional silence should, therefore, be understood to leave this power-the
power to say what it is that Congress has done-with the courts, where
it has always been.
Indeed, it is illogical to read Chevron as establishing that an agency's
understanding of what Congress has done is controlling. The court
must at least determine that Congress has given such instructions. That
determination is necessarily a determination of congressional intent. It
would be extraordina·ry for a court not only to deem an agency's interpretations binding, but also to deem the agency's view that its interpretations are binding as binding. At a minimum, the court must make the
latter determination. 86

II.

CONFRONTING AMBIGUITY IN STEP ONE.

If Chevron is a revolutionary case, what makes it so is its apparent
hospitality to implied delegations generally, and delegations by ambiguity in particular. If mere ambiguity counts as a delegation, then agency
rules that are interpretive in the sense of merely delineating what Congress has decided become binding on the courts despite the absence of
express delegation. Chevron then would have eliminated the category of
interpretive rules, with "the power to persuade, if lacking the power to
control," 87 and made Skidmore historical curiosity. A statute either is
clear and therefore agency interpretations are irrelevant, or it is un86. The point resembles a common refutation of John Marshall's reliance in Marbury on the proposition that the power of judicial review derives from the judiciary's
duty to "say what the law is." The Court might, in doing so, say that the Constitution
grants Congress the authority to determine the constitutionality of its own enactments.
That conclusion would itself be an interpretation of the Constitution. David P. Currie,

The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 18011835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646, 658 n.77 (1982); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical
Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 16-29. Similarly, a court must interpret the statute to determine if it gives the agency interpretive authority.
Professor Anthony, who seems to have no quarrel with Chevron generally, invokes
Marbury and speaks of the "abdication of judicial duties" in arguing that no more
than Skidmore deference should apply when a court reviews an interpretive rule.
Anthony, supra note 48, at 57. The reliance on Marbury seems somewhat misplaced,
for if Congress has clearly rendered agency interpretations binding, the court is still
saying what the Jaw is in determining that Congress has done so. Monaghan, supra
note 48, at 26-27; see supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text (discussing deference
due when Congress has expressly granted interpretive authority to agency). Professor
Anthony is on solid ground, however, in invoking the courts' traditional role of interpreting congressional intent absent a clear showing that Congress has displaced them
with an administrative agency.
87. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see supra notes 31-36 and
accompanying text (discussing standard of review of interpretive rules).
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clear and agency interpretations are binding.
Under this strong reading of Chevron, step one cases would be both
utterly straightforward and few and far between. In practice, however,
the Supreme Court seems to have decided statutory cases on its own,
within step one, even where it would be hard to say that Congress truly
has spoken to the precise question at issue. 88 Under the reading ofChevron advocated in this Article, the Court has not in fact been back. sliding. Rather, these cases reflect the fact that in some settings there is
room for argument about the proper in~erpretation of a statute but the
question remains one of statutory meaning, not pure policy. For all the
traditional reasons, an agency's views will be relevant but not binding
in answering the question. In short, there is a role for Skidmore deference within step one.
The Court's treatment of this question has been inconsistent. At
times it suggests that Skidmore is a dead letter,. at other times it ritually invokes the Skidmore factors. I argue that a mere lack of clarity is
not a delegation and reports of Skidmore's death are greatly
exaggerated.

A.

Types of Ambiguity

Justice Scalia has stated that "the chink in Chevron's armor-the
ambiguity that prevents it from being an absolutely clear guide to future judicial decisions" 89-is uncertainty as to what it takes to move
from step one to step two. "How ,elear is clear?" 90 If there is an express
delegation of legislative authority, this problem does not arise. It is in~
escapable, however, in deciding whether to proceed to step two because
the "statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue." 91
Courts should not equate a mere lack of clarity with a delegation of
decision-making authority to the agency. 92 Congress is ·rarely crystal
clear, and courts resolve statutory ambiguities all the time. Indeed, it is
88. See generally Merrill, supra note 3, at 990-93, 1000-03 (describing Court's
"reformulation" of step one inquiry to allow judicial resolution whenever statute has
plain, or clearly preferred, meaning).
89. Scalia, supra note 4, at 520.
90. Id.
91. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
92. The temptation to do so is great. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
EPA, 898 F.2d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reading "the ambiguities and perplexities of
the statute as delegating to the agency a broad interpretive authority"); see also Sunstein, Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 467 (stating that "[a]lthough the Chevron
rule of deference is appropriate when Congress purposely has left a gap for agency
resolution, a different rule should apply when there is merely ambiguity"); sources
cited at supra note 52.
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when Congress is ambiguous that judicial review is arguably most important, for there is the greatest danger that an agency will misread
congressional intent.
At what point a statute becomes so ambiguous as to be a delegation
is difficult to quantify. In fact, most efforts to do so sound quite a bit
alike. For example, Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens have issued opposing warnings about under-stating or over-stating Chevron's reach.
Fearing too narrow a reading of Chevron, Justice Scalia stresse$ that it
is not necessary for opposing arguments to be in "absolute equipoise"
for the necessary ambiguity to exist. 93 Fearing too broad a reading,
Justice Stevens warns that "[t]he task of interpreting a statute requires
more than merely inventing an ambiguity and invoking administrative
deference." 94 I suspect that neither Justice would disagree with the
other's admonition at this level of generality and abstraction. Similarly,
although their views of Chevron are fundamentally different, I doubt
that Justice Scalia would disagree with Professor Sunstein that "[i]f
the court has a firm eonviction that the agency interpretation viola,tes
the statute, that interpretation must fail." 96 In the application, however, disagreement reigns as to the clarity of particular statutes. Not
surprisingly, since Chevron, where some Justices find clarity others discover ambiguity, and that disagreement in turn determines how they
would decide the case. 96 Of course, the cynic would suggest the reverse
sequence; that the Justices decide on an outcome, which in turn determines whether they find (or label) the statute clear or ambiguous.
Whether Chevron, or any legal doctrine, constrains anything but
judges' vocabulary is a question for another day.
If one is to search for verbal formulations of the extent of ambiguity
that triggers step two, Professor Sunstein's seems as good as any. But
93. Scalia, supra note 4, at 520.
94. Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 988 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
95. Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 4, at 2092.
96. See Rust v. Sullivan,_ U.S.-, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1767~69 (1991) (upholding
regulation as permissible interpretation of ambiguous statute); id. at 1788 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (finding statute clear and agency's interpretation inconsistent with it); Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83 (1990) (upholding regulations as permissible interpretation of statute, which had not spoken directly to issue); id. at 973 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that regulations violated congressional intent that was "clear beyond
peradventure"); Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 42 (1990) (finding defe~ence inappropriate because "the statute, as a whole, clearly expresses Congress' intention"); id. at 43 (White, J.; dissenting) (contending that statute was not clear and
therefore deference was due); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990) (setting aside
regulation as manifestly contrary to statute); id. at 541 (White, J., dissenting) (contending that regulation must be upheld as permissible interpretation of unclear
statute).
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no such formulation will ever be sufficient to overcome the blind spots
or disingenuousness of individual judges. There will always be cases
where only some judges find the statute ambiguous, 97 or where all
agree it is pellucid, but disagree as to its indisputable meaning. 98 The
situation resembles the application of the "clearly erroneous" standard
to district court findings of fact, from which Professor Sunstein borrows
his "firm conviction" test. 99 Just what is "clearly erroneous" is difficult
to quantify; there is no significant disagreement at the most abstract
level, yet results will vary from judge to judge. The quantity of ambiguity simply cannot be defined usefully in the abstract.
Ambiguity varies not only quantitatively, but qualitatively as well,
and it is the qualitative difference that really matters. Consider the
well-known case of Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, 100 in
which the Court upheld the view of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services that he had discretion as to whether to issue certain
regulations. The statute required the Secretary to "promulgate regulations limiting the quantity of [poisonous or deleterious substances in or
on food] to such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of public health." 101 The Secretary contended that "to such extent as he finds
necessary" qualified his duty to promulgate regulations. 102 The District
of Columbia Circuit held that it qualified only the "limiting the quantity" phrase, thus obligating the Secretary to regulate all poisonous
substances but leaving him discretion in determining allowable
97. Dissenting judges often accuse the majority of inventing an ambiguity in order
to defer and avoid the merits altogether. See, e.g., Young v. Community Nutrition
Inst., 476 U:S. 974, 988 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920
F.2d 984, 994-95 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting).
98. In Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26 (1990), for example, a majority of
seven Justices held that the statute unambiguously confirmed the agency's interpretation; the dissenters argued that it unambiguously contradicted the agency. See also
Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, _U.S._, 112 S. Ct. 820, 831-32 (1992) (deciding case under Chevron's step one and rejecting government's position); id. at 83440 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with government's p9sition, but relying directly
on statute rather than on principle of deference). The Court was split even more severely in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281 (1988). Justice Kennedy's opinion
upheld the regulation as a permissible interpretation of a vague statute. Justice Brennan found that the statute was clear and compelled the agency's interpretation. Justice
Scalia found that the statute was clear and contradicted the agency's interpretation.
99. FED. R. C1v. P. 52(a). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
100. 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
101. 21 u.s.c. § 346 (1988).
102. Young, 476 U.S. at 979.
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amounts. 103 The Supreme Court found the statute ambiguous and the
agency's interpretation permissible; it reversed the circuit court under
Chevron's step two. 104
The decision in Young prompted a fierce dissent from Justice Stevens1011 and has been roundly condemned by academic commentary. 106
The usual criticism is that the statute simply was not sufficiently ambiguous to merit blind acceptance of the agency's interpretation. The
real defect in the opinion is slightly different, however .. It is a function
of the type rather than the amount of ambiguity. Justice O'Connor
states that Congress "was speaking directly to the precise question at
issue" but failed "unambiguously [to] express[] its intent through its
choice of statutory language." 107 If Congress has spoken to the issue,
however, Chevron deference is inappropriate notwithstanding ambiguity. In such circumstances, unlike in Chevron, Congress did have an
intent, which binds both the court and the agency. One of the reasons
we have courts to interpret statutes is because Congress is often unclear. There is no delegation to the agency in this setting; the only
question is what Congress meant. As we have seen, that question is for
judicial resolution. 108
In sum, Congress might mean to express something but do so ambiguously, or it might be ambiguous because it meoot to express nothing.
Chevron's step two should apply only in the second situation, which is
what Chevron itself involved.
103.

Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 757 F.2d 354, 357-61 (D.C. Cir. 1985),

rev'd, 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
104. Young, 476 U.S. at 974.
105. Young, 476 U.S. at 988 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The task of interpreting a
statute requires more than merely inventing an ambiguity and invoking· administrative
deference.").
106. See Farina, supra note 4, at 462 ("Young graphically demonstrates the extremism of which the new deference is capable."); S.idney A. Shapiro & Robert L.
Glicksman, Congress, The Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 859 (stating that Young indicates Court's "presumption
of ambiguity"); Sunstein, Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 466-67 & nn.205, 208.
107. Young, 476 U.S. at 980 (emphasis added).
108. The distinction might be stated as being between "vagueness" and "ambiguity." As described by Professors Eskridge and Frickey, "[a]mbiguity creates an 'either/
or' situation, while vagueness creates a variety of possible meanings." WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIPP. fRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 839 (1988). Under this formulation, the statute
in Young was ambiguous but it was not vague. The Chevron opinion, like almost all
later commentary, uses the term "ambiguous," but under this formulation it commands
deference only when the statute is "vague."
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Deference Within Step One

The Court has given confusing signals about the role of Skidmore
deference in the post-Chevron era. On the one hand, it has not forgotten the Skidmore factors. In Cardoza-Fonseca, for example, it seemed
to work the Skidmore approach into the Chevron framework. Explicitly
operating within step one, Justice Stevens noted that the weight of the
agency's interpretation was diminished because it had been inconsistent
over the years. 100 The Court has also indicated that consistency is relevant in evaluating an agency's interpretation under step two. 11 ° Furthermore, in a recent case involving EEOC interpretive bulletins, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion relied on Skidmore and did not
cite Chevron,m suggesting that there are sjtuations where Skidmore
applies that fall altogether outside the Chevron framework. On the
other hand, most deference opinions no longer cite Skidmore. Indeed,
Justice Scalia has pronounced Skidmore dead: "In an era when our
treatment of agency positions is governed by Chevron, the 'legislative
rul~s vs. other action' dichotomy ... is an anachronism." 112
Skidmore deference might seem wholly out of place after Chevron.113 The Skidmore factors, which go to the likelihood that the
agency's interpretation accurately reflects congressional intent, clearly
have no place in step two cases. 114 Skidmore could be relevant under
step one precisely because there the issue is congressional intent. Yet
under the usual understanding of step one cases, Skidmore deference
would be superfluous. In step one, the statute alone provides the answer; the statute is so clear that resort to the agency for guidance is, by
definition, unnecessary. In this view, deference is all or nothing; 115 ei109. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987).
110. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., _ U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2535
(1991).
111. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,_ U.S._·_, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1236 (1991).
The EEOC took the position that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000(a)-(h)(6) (1988), applies to American companies operating abroad. The Court
ruled that Title VII applies only within the United States.
' 112. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1236 (Scalia, J., concurring).
113. Justice Scalia views all .regulations as meriting full Chevron deference and
rejects the idea that some have "only the power to persuade." Id. See also Schuck &
Elliott, supra note 3, at 1024 (stating that Chevron "[s]wept aside all of these [Skidmore] criteria for determining the extent of deference in favor of a dramatic reformulation of the grounds for deferring to agency constructions of statutes").
114. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (explaining that consistency of
agency's position is irrelevant under Chevron).
115. Strictly speaking, to defer means to accept another's decision or authority.
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 263 · (1942) (defining "defer" as "[t]o yield or
submit to the opinion or wishes of another, or to authority"). In the context of judicial
"deference" to agency interpretations, however, courts use the term to mean "respect"
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ther agency interpretations control or they are irrelevant.
I have tried to show, however, that there is a class of
cases-including, but not limited to, review of interpretive
rules-where Congress has not delegated either the interpretive or the
legislative task to the agency. The court remains the primary interpreter, and the question is one of statutory meaning, not one of raw
policy. The statute is not necessarily crystal clear in these cases. Within
step one, the court seeks to determine the meaning of the statute; for
all the traditional reasons 116 the agency's view may be helpful in doing
so. In fact, the Chevron opinion supports the continuing role of Skidmore deference. Within step one, the court attempts to determine congressional intent "employing the traditional tools of statutory construction;"117 one of those tools, of course, is the interpretation of the agency
charged with administering the statute. 118
C.

Are There Interpretive Rules After Chevron?

The traditional principles concerning judicial review of interpretive
rules survive Chevron. Interpretations in rules fall into three categories:
rules that volunteer the agency's understanding of the statute; rules
that explain the statute pursuant to an express delegation of interpretive authority; and interpretations that underlie, but are not stated in,
legislative rules. Review under st~p two is appropriate only with regard
or "weight." Hence the frequent references to degrees of deference. See, e.g., Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 56 (1981)
(holding that Board deserved "greatest" deference); NLRB v. Hearst Publications,
Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944) (giving varying weight to agency views according to
importance of expertise); Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (noting that degree of deference is not uniform). See also Scalia, supra note
4, at 514 (explaining that "[t]he mealy-mouthed word 'deference' does not necessarily
mean anything more than considering those views with attentiveness and profound respect, before we reject them").
It has been argued that Chevron "modif[ies]" the traditional judicial usage, redefining "deference"' to mean controlling weight. Starr, supra note 4, at 296. But see
Strauss, supra note 48, at 1126 (Chevron step two requires something more than "deference"). As I discuss, the principle of varying degrees of deference survives Chevron.
116. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing justifications for
deference where court's task is to determine statutory meaning).
117. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
118. Strauss, supra note 48, at 1125. "Like the testimony of involved executive
branch officials .at congressional hearings or the initial interpretations given a statute by
the responsible agency, an agency interpretation that has remained constant over the
years can plausibly be regarded as evidence of what is assumed to be a determinate
congressional meaning, one to be found out by the courts." Id. (footnotes omitted). See
Willam V. Luneburg, Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Construction: An Introduction, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 243, 250 (1988) (stating that Skidmore deference is "presumably"
still applicable within step one).
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to the second category.

I.

Traditional Interpretive Rules

The traditional understanding of interpretive rules is that they explain what Congress has decided. By definition, therefore, review of an
interpretive rule must belong in step one. With the notable exception of
Justice Scalia, 119 no court or commentator has explicitly stated that
Chevron eliminates the old rule that interpretive rules are not binding.120 Nonetheless, numerous decisions have, without discussion, upheld interpretive rules under Chevron step two. 121 One author has de119. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,_ U.S.-, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1236
(I 991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting any distinction between deference owed legislative rules and that owed other agency actions).
,
120. For example, in the 1990 Supplement to his horn book, Professor Koch states:
The idea that the effect of a validly promulgated rule on the courts is governed
by the distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules has become so
strongly established that it may be one of the few "black letter" laws in administrative law. The difference in effect on the courts is immense.
Because they are made pursuant to delegated authority, legislative rules have
the force of law and a court may test them only for arbitrariness. Whereas, [a]
nonlegislative rule, the result of no such delegation, may be subjected to agreement (de novo) review.
1 KocH, supra note 36, at 41 (citations and footnotes omitted). Similarly, Professors
Pierce, Shapiro, and Verkuil, enthusiastic supporters of Chevron, also endorse a less
deferential approach to interpretive rules. RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO,
& PAUL R. VERKUJL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 310 (1985). They comment
approvingly on a court decision suggesting that an agency conclusion struck down in
the form of an interpretive rule might be upheld as part of a legislative rule. Id.
121. See, e.g., Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Chaves County Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914,917,923 {D.C. Cir.
1991); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bush, 918 F.2d 1323, 1327 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1990);
Seldovia Native Ass'n, Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Fidelity
Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 913-14 (3d Cir. 1990); National Recycling
Coalition, Inc. v. Reilly, 884 F.2d 1431, 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Guadamuz v. Bowen,
859 F.2d 762, 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1988); Samaritan Health Serv. v. Bowen, 811 F.2d
1524, 1530 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Hicks v. Cantrell, 803 F.2d 789, 792 ( 4th Cir. 1986);
Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Servs. v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 391, 397 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988); Arrow Air, Inc. v. Dole,784 F.2d 1118,
1125 (D.C. Cir. 1986); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority, 778 F.2d 850, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1985); General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus,
742 F.2d 1561, 1566-67 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074
(1985). See also Public Employee Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 182 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (invoking Chevron where majority had rejected agency's interpretive regulation as being simply inconsistent with statute); Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA,
935 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding Chevron applicable to review of interpretive
rule but setting rule aside under step one); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430,
437 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that new EPA interpretation set out in n:iailgram was
ripe for review in part because it would command Chevron deference from court and
therefore had significant legal effect).
.
Some courts have stated that interpretive rules are not binding, like legislative rules,
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scribed the result as the creation of a class of "interpretative rules with
legislative effect." 122
Under the traditional understanding of interpretative rules as merely
a clarification of congressional action, these decisions are plainly incorrect. An interpretive rule by definition adds nothing to what Congress
has done. Where the agency issues an interpretive rule, then, congressional intent is necessarily discernable. Yet Chevron concerns those situations where Congress is silent and without intent. By its riature, an
interpretive rule is subject to step one review, for the basic idea is that
rather than delegating the decision to the agency, Congress has made
the decision which the agency is explicating. On the other hand, if
Congress has not acted, as in Chevron itself, then the rule cannot be
but nonetheless merit Chevron deference. Rodlin v. Secretary of HHS, 750 F. Supp.
146, 150 (D.N.J. 1990). There is not really space in the taxonomy for such a category.
I know of only one decision that expressly finds Chevron inapplicable to interpretive as
opposed to legislative rules. See Capitano v. Secretary of HHS, 732 F.2d 1066, 1076
(2d Cir. 1984) (opinion on denial of rehearing) (rejecting agency's interpretation as
inconsistent with statute and noting that Chevron does not "change this result since we
do not have a legislative regulation here").
The Supreme Court has been unclear. The Court implicitly held Chevron inapplicable to interpretive rules in EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., _ U.S. - , 111 S. Ct.
1227 (1991) (citing Skidmore but not Chevron in rejecting view of statute set out in
EEOC interpretive bulletin); but see id. at 1236-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (according
EEOC interpretation full Chevron deference), and explicitly declared Chevron inapplicable in dictum in Martin v. OSHRC, _U.S.-, 111 S. Ct. 1171, 1179 (1991)
(stating that interpretive rules and enforcement guidelines are "entitled to some weight
on judicial review" but not "to the same deference as norms that derive from the exercise of ... delegated lawmaking powers").
122. Saunders, supra note 29. Saunders argues that such weight should be accorded only to interpretive rules that have undergone notice and comment. Id. at 37182. This is the most recent variation on a longstanding strain of both judicial opinion
and academic commentary arguing th~t any rule with a substantial impact requires
notice and comment. See Neighborhood TV Co. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 637 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984) (holding that whether rule is substantive, and
therefore subject to APA notice and comment requirements, turns on whether it will
have substantial impact on substantive rights and interests); Lewis-Mota v. Secretary
of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972) (concluding that "[b]y virtue of this substantial impact both upon the aliens and their employers, notice and opportunity for
comment by the public should first be provided"); William T. Mayton, A Concept of a
Rule and the "Substantial Impact" Test in Rulemaking, 33 EMORY L.J. 889, 898-99
(1984) (arguing that agency action, having "palpable effect" across segment of society
should be subject to notice and comment); Ricki Rhodarmer Tigert, Note, A Functional Approach to the Application of Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure
Act to Agency Statements of Policy, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 430, 432-33 (1976) (arguing
that agencies should provide notice and comment when doing so will protect private
interests and serve informed policy-making). This approach is on the wane in the federal courts. See Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1991); American Mining Congress v. Marshall, 671 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1982); see generally Kathleen Taylor, Note, The Substantial Impact Test: Victim of the Fallout from Vermont
Yankee?, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 118 (1985) (concluding that most circuits have rejected substantial impact test in light of Vermont Yankee).
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classified as interpretive because there is nothing to interpret. With regard to agency interpretations in this sense, then, Chevron by its terms
does not make agency conclusions binding.

2.

Express Delegations of Interpretive Authority

Congress may expressly delegate what seems under the above standard to be "interpretive" authority. Interpretations made pursuant to
express legislative delegation should be reviewed under step two. Such
rules, of course, would n9t be deemed interpretive rules precisely because of the delegation. 123 Such delegation must be express.

3.

Interpretations that Underlie Legislative Rules

This leaves a third category of interpretations: those that underlie
but are not stated in legislative mles. Consider the NAAQS again. In
implementing the statutory directive to establish safe levels of air pollution, EPA promulgates a rule that is little more than a number identifying the acceptable concentration of a specific pollutant. 124 A reviewing court plainly cannot substitute its judgment for the agency's as to
the appropriate concentration. In that sense the rule is "binding" on
the courts. The standard itself-the actual number-is of course not a
binding interpretation, but is based on certain interpretations. For example, to develo;, a primary NAAQS, .EPA must first decide who con~
stitutes the "public" whose health is to be protected. Must the standard
be set at the level where the average adult is unaffected? The average
child? Asthmatics? The single most sensitive individual? Whether this
is a question of interpretation depends on whether there is anything to
interpret. Congress might have left this question to the agency, although it is the sort of basic policy question one would expect Congress
to decide. The legislative history indicates that Congress viewed the
"public" as the most sensitive group, 125 and EPA has so read the .Act.
The fact that this interpretation of the term "public" was the predicate
for a h:;gislative rule should not mean that it binds the courts under
Chevron. As an interpretation, it merits Skidmore deference but no
more, and that is what it has received. 126
123. See Wint v. Yeutter, 902 F.2d 76, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that Chevron
step two applies "given Congress's explicit delegation to the USDA of the authority to
define, not merely to apply, the terms in question").
124. See 40 C.F.R. part 50 (1991) (setting out National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS)).
·
125. S. REP. No. I 196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970).
126. See Lead Indus. Ass'n. Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir.) (upholding
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Yet Chevron's strong message of judicial deference is taken to apply
with full force to agency-interpretations contained in legislative rules.
Professor Anthony writes:
Interpretations are often expressed through the exercise of the agency's statutorily-delegated authority to make law in the form of rules. Interpretations set
forth in this format possess the fullest credentials to command judicial acceptance. They are "given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute." 127

To the extent Anthony is discussing situations where there was an express delegation of interpretive authority, I agree. If the suggestion is
that, for example, the statutory interpretations that underlie a rule
such as the NAAQS are also binding, I disagree.
Assume for now that "interpretations" within legislative rules receive
full Chevron respect, but those set out in interpretive rules do not. 128
This distinction is not self-evident. One would think that an _interpretation is an interpretation. If deference is really to vary with the setting,
so that in some cases the ultimate interpretive task is the court's and in
others it is the agency's, some relevant differences between the settings
must be identified.
One difference between interpretive and legislative rules is that only
the latter are the result of notice and comment rulemaking. 120 One
could argue that only rules that result from public scrutiny and discussion merit full deference. This reasoning resonates with cases and commentary requiring or suggesting notice and comment procedures even
for interpretive rules if they have a substantial impact 130 and with Congress' original rationale for excluding interpretive rules from notice and
comment requirements. 131 Such a link between full procedures and deference might also underlie the Supreme Court's rule that agency litigating positions do not merit full Chevron deference. 132 However, this
NAAQS for lead), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
127. Anthony, supra note 48, at 44 (quoting Chevron). Professor Anthony also
states that the fact that a legislative rule embodies a statutory interpretation does not
mean it carries any less force. Id. at n.205.
128. That deference should vary with format is the central argument of Anthony,
supra note 48.
129. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(A), (d)(2) (1988).
130. See supra note 122 (discussing view that any rule having substantial impact
requires notice and comment).
131. The Senate Report accompanying the Administrative Procedure Act explained
that notice and comment was unnecessary for interpretive rules because these
"rules-as merely interpretations of statutory provisions-are subject to plenary judicial review." S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946).
132. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, _ U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2414 n.3 (1991)
(White, J., concurring); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13
(1988). The Supreme Court also hinted that procedural fullness should bear on
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difference is inadequate to justify giving controlling weight to interpretations embodied in legislative rules but not those in interpretive rules.
Notice and comment followed by arbitrary and capricious review is
not the equivalent of de novo judicial review without notice and comment. First, notice and comment proceedings are typically geared more
to full development of policy concerns than legal issues. Second, even if
statutory ambiguities are fully discussed in the comments, when Chevron applies, the agency knows that the courts will uphold any "permissible" interpretation. A private party attacking the agency's interpretation is in a weaker position submitting comments to an agency that
knows its interpretation will control, than making legal arguments to a
court under a de novo standard, even without notice and comment. Full
public discussion does not replace meaningful judicial review, for the
lack of meaningful judicial review largely undercuts the value of the
discussion, at least on legal issues. The second argument for reduced
deference to interpretations contained in interpretive rules is that Congress has not delegated to the agency authority to make binding interpretations in this format. 133 This is a stronger theoretical argument; it
identifies a coherent reason for accepting the agency's interpretation in
one setting and not the other. The problem lies in finding some indication that Congress wants interpretations underlying legislative rules to
be binding, but does not have such an intent with regard to interpretive
rules. One might argue that because interpretive rules have never been
deemed binding, Congress must have legislated with this understanding. It therefore presumably intends interpretive rules, but only such
rules, not to be binding unless it indicates to the contrary. This background rule only gets us so far. First, it rests on a speculative and heroic assumption about Congress' understanding of the doctrinal framework of judicial review of agency action. Second, a delegation to write
legislative rules is not in itself a delegation to make binding interpretations of the statute, as the NAAQS example illustrates. Third, there is
simply no reason to think that Congress might actually want the
agency interpretations to be binding if they underlie legislative rules,
but not otherwise.
Finally, even if setting does matter in theory, it may make little
practical difference. Professor Anthony posits the situation where an
whether a rule binds the courts in Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Federal
Labor Relations Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 98 n.8 (1983). There it stated that an FLRA
"Interpretation and Guidance" document might carry controlling weight because,
among other things, it "was attended by at least some of the procedural characteristics
of a rulemaking." Id.
133. For an extended statement of this argument, see Anthony, supra note 48.
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agency possesses the authority to interpret with the force of law,
through a legislative rule, but thus far has expressed its interpretation
only informally. If that interpretation becomes subject to direct review
before the agency has taken concrete action based upon it, the court
should not be able to intercept the agency's delegated interpretive authority by taking advantage of the as yet non-legislative status of the
agency interpretation and telling the agency what definitive view to
adopt. The court should merely decide whether the interpretation is invalid on its face, a quasi-step two inquiry, leaving the agency "untrammeled in its freedom to choose a position anywhere within the zone of
indeterminacy." 134 If the underlying distinction is correct, this is a necessary refinement. If the agency has primary interpretive authority,
then it would contravene congressional ~ntent and the allocation of responsibility to deprive the agency of such authority by a quirk of timing. It is, however, a rather large exception that eliminates the supposed critical importance of format. Under this approach, if the agency
lacks authority to issue binding legislative rules, then there has not
been the subject matter delegation that must exist to proceed to Chevron's second step. This fact alone is enough to keep the court in step
one, regardless of the format of the agency interpretation. If, on the
other hand, the agency possesses such aut_hority, then the court is unable to construe the statute independently even though the format is
non binding.
In short, there is no strong reason for saying that interpretations in
an interpretive rule have different force than interpretations underlying
a legislative rule. If I am right that interpretive rules should not be
binding, 135 then it follows that interpretations found in legislative ·rules
should not be binding either. Indeed, as I have defined "interpretations"-agency views of congressional meaning-there is no reason
they should be. The difference in judicial deference to legislative and
interpretive rules rests on a difference in the relation of these agency
determinations to the statute. To the extent the rule, whether interpretive or legislative, rests on, or can be meaningfully reviewed under, the
statute, no more than Skidmore deference is appropriate. To the extent
the agency is operating within a discretionary zone established by Con134. Id. at 41-42. The same position is taken in Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880
F.2d 1325, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that when "dealing with an ambiguous term
... a court should not interpose its own interpretation of the term before the agency
has an opportunity to consider the issue and fix on its own statutory construction")
(emphasis in original).
135. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (discussing-review of interpretive rules under step one of Chevron).
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gress, and therefore not "interpreting" the statute, step two applies. 136

III.

APPLYING. CHEVRON

All Chevron questions reduce to one question: d9es the statute provide an answer? All efforts to limit Chevron-it should not apply to
pure questions of law, it should not apply to interpretive rules, it should
not apply to an agency's determination of its jurisdiction or the scope of
its authority, it should not apply unless the statute is very ambiguous, it
should not apply unless and until the court has derived all it can from
the statute--are different formulations of one idea. The court must follow the statute before it follows the agency.
To say that the courts must ensure that agencies adhere to what
Congress has decided is not a stunning new insight; that much is clear
on the face of the Chevron opinion. But it is a less trivial point than it
seems. Chevron stands as a constant invitation to ignore what Congress
has decided because it did not decide, in the unfortunate language of
the Chevron opinion, "the precise question at issue." 137 The remainder
of this Article examines these temptations in certain illustrative and
controversial settings to identify just when step two kicks in and when
it does not.

A.

Agencies' Interpretations of Their Own Authority

Many commentators have tripped over the fact that Chevron seems
to allow agencies to determine the scope of their own authority. 138 The
136. The distinction I have in mind is discussed by Judge Posner:
Often when there are political pressures to do something about a problem but
the legislature cannot agree exactly what to do about it, it will pass a statute the
effect (as well as the undisclosed purpose) of which is to dump the problem in
the lap of the courts, taking advantage of the fact that the courts are a kind of
political lightning rod. But this implies that the courts are expected to try to
solve the problem; they have a mandate, though no specific directions. So unless
this mode of legislation is thought to be unconstitutional, the courts have a duty
and not merely a power to solve the problem in a reasonable way. This is invention rather than discovery; it is "interpretation" only in a special sense ....
POSNER, supra note 62, at 290. Substitute "agencies" for "the courts" in the foregoing
and you have the Chevron problem. To the extent Congress has dumped the problem in
the agency's lap, what the agency is doing is "'interpretation' only in a special sense,"
id., and step two applies. Even there, however, the court must (1) determine on its own
whether Congress has done so and (2) enforce those decisions Congress can fairly be
said to have made.
137. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 843 n.9.
138. See Anthony, supra note 48, at 54-55 (stating that "one may wonder whether
Chevron will enduringly displace the deeply-rooted doctrine that an 'agency may not
finally decide the limits of its statut0ry power. That is a judicial function.'" (quoting
Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946))); Shapiro & Glicksman, supra
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issue was disputed in the Supreme Court in Mississippi Power & Light
Co. v. Mississippi. 139 Justice Scalia argued that it is "settled law" that
Chevron's deference principle applies with full force to jurisdictional
issues. In response, Justice Brennan insisted that deference does not
apply to the jurisdictional inquiry, but only to the application of statutes that an agency has been "entrusted to administer. " 140 As to descriptive accuracy, Justice Scalia has the better of this disagreement. 141
In fact, Justices Marshall and Blackmun, who had agreed with Justice
Brennan, later found themselves unsuccessfully urging deference to the
EEOC's view that Title VII applies outside the United States. 142 On
note f06, at 866 (arguing that for administrators "to decide the scope of their own
authority ... violates the idea of separation of powers"); Sunstein, Interpreting, supra
note 52, at 446 (admonishing that "foxes should not guard henhouses"); Sunstein, Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 467 (stating also that "foxes should not guard
henhouses"). Professor Sunstein's most recent formulation is that Chevrorz should apply
where the jurisdictional determination involves "one or a few cases," but not "when the
issue is whether the agency's authority extends to a broad area of regulation, or to a
large category of cases, except to the extent foat the answer to that question calls for
determination of fact or policy." Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 4, at
2100.
139. 487 U.S. 354 (1988). Justice Scalia's views were endorsed by Justice White,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 54
(1990) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Scalia's "lucid concurrence" in Mississippi Power & Light Co. and noting "that Chevron itself and several of our cases decided since Chevron have deferred to agencies' determinations of matters that affect
their own statutory jurisdiction").
140. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354,
386 (1988) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). The majority opinion did not address the agency's jurisdiction, and so had no need to consider
Chevron's relevance to the issue.
The District of Columbia Circ.uit has likewise raised but failed to resolve the question of Chevron's application to agencies' jurisdictional determinations. See Business
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408. (D.C. Cir. 1990) (deciding case on other
grounds; noting failure of Supreme Court to definitively resolve issue); New York Shipping Ass'n v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that deference "may ... be inappropriate" where agency is interpreting provisions
"delimiting its jurisdiction"); Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce,
839 F.2d 795, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Starr, J., dissenting) (applying Chevron with full
force because "the issue before us is not a question of the agency's power (in the sense
of its jurisdictional reach) in which deference to the agency might be less justified").
141. Farina, supra note 4, at 463 n.53. Cases in which the Court has applied Chevron to jurisdictional questions include K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,
291-93 (1988) (plurality opinion); id. at 1827-28 (Brennan, J., concurring), and United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985). But see Adams
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990); .Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.
v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986) (rejecting, without .citation to Chevron,
Federal Reserve Board's broad view of which financial institutions were "banks" within
its jurisdiction).
142. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., _
U.S. - , 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1245-46
(1991) (Marshall, J.,"joined by Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting). See also infra
note 149 ( discussing reluctance to defer to agency's view of extraterrritorial application
of statute it administers).
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the merits, however, Justice Scalia and Justice Brennan are, perhaps,
both right.
Whatever it is that Chevron requires, it requires it equally with regard to substantive and jurisdictional questions. Jurisdiction frequently
hinges on a vague statutory term that the agency is charged with defining more specifically. Thus, Congress has delegated to the Ariny Corps
of Engineers, the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Reserve
Board, and the Securities and Exci1ange Commission the authority to
determine, respectively, who or what constitutes "waters of the United
States," 143 an "employee," 144 a "bank," 145 and a "security," 146 under
statutes that regulate waters, employees, banks, and securitie·s. The
agency's expertise and accountability are as relevant to jurisdictional
issues as they are to substantive ones. The agencies are best equipped
to decide whether certain difficult to classify places, persons, entities, or
financial instruments bear a sufficiently close resemblance to the paradigmatic examples to justify inclusion in those categories. Although allowing agencies to define their own jurisdiction may create opportunities for abuse and self-aggrandizement, 147 and one might worry that
expertise and accountability will give way to self-interest in jurisdictional decisions, the same threat is present in substantive agency determinations. The consequences of giving agencies a free hand in jurisdictional matters are not significantly different than those of letting the
agency flesh out substantive requirements. Indeed, the jurisdictional
regulations may be far less important. The usual industry complaints
about being shackled by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, for example, are in no way jurisdictional; they concern onerous
substantive standards rather than an expansive understanding of what
counts as a "place of employment." 148 By the same token, undercutting
143. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988), requires a
permit from the Army Corps of Engineers for the discharge of any dredged or fill
material into the "waters of the United States." The program has been controversial
because the Corps defines such \Yaters to include swamps and wetlands. In upholding
this expansive definition, the Court invoked Chevron and inquired only whether the
Corps' broad view was "reasonable." United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985).
144. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
145. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474
U.S. 361 (1986).
146: Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468
U.S. 137 (1984).
.
147. See Sunstein, Interpreting, supra note 52, at 446 (observing that need for
aggressive judicial review made especially "vivid by imagining cases involving such
questions as ... whether agency jurisdiction extends to new or unforeseen areas").
148. Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Secretary establishes
safety and health standards as necessary to ensure "safe or healthful employment and
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a regulatory scheme by defining jurisdiction too narrowly-a common
enough allegation in many areas of health and safety regulation-is
generally not as significant a problem as understating substantive obligations. The point is not that issues of jurisdiction are unimportant or
pose no threat of a self-aggrandizing agency running amok. But, effective judicial review is no more essential to the integrity of the regulatory scheme here than elsewhere. There is, therefore, no reason to have
different standards of deference for jurisdictional matters. 149
On the other hand, Chevron does not require a court to accept an
agency's view of the scope of its delegated authority, jurisdictional or
.substantive. By definition, Congress cannot have left this determination
to the agency. Even accepting a notion of delegation by ambiguity, it is
the court that must determine the bounds of the ambiguity. Suppose,
for example, Congress passes a statute directing the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to ensure that all. "passenger
automobiles" are "safe. " 150 The key statutory terms are ambiguous,
and the agency may have broad interpretive authority. Congress has
probably left it to the NHTSA to decide whether to regulate, for example, pick-up trucks used to carry farm produce. Nonetheless, Congress
. has foreclosed NHTSA regulation of trains, buses, motorcycles, and
bicycles 151-these are outside the agency's authority. Some boundaries
are inescapably established by statute and are, therefore, for the courts
places of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1988). Each "employer" must comply
with the standards and provide "a place of employment . . . -free from recognized
hazards." Id. § 654(a).
149. Concerns about agency overreaching, combined with the importance of jurisdictional questions in particular settings, may inform a court's view as to whether Congress has made the delegation necessary to trigger step two. For example, the courts
have been appropriately wary about deferring to an agency's view that the statute it
administers applies extraterritorially. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,_ U.S.-,
111 S. Ct. 1227, 1235-36 (1991) (rejecting EEOC's conclusion that Title VII applies
extraterritorially); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 493
& n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting agency's view that statute authorized it to subpoena
witnesses and documents outside United States). The refusal to defer in these cases is
not the result of the issue being jurisdictional. Rather, it reflects the fact that it would
be extraordinary for Congress to have delegated this decision to the agency. Particularly in light of the historic presumption against extraterritorial application of federal
statutes, Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949), Congress is presumed to
have decided the matter, if only by its silence, and so the case is properly analyzed
under step one.
150. This invented statute owes something to, and raises some of the same ambiguities as, H.L.A. Hart's hypothetical rule that no vehicle may be taken into the park.
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 115 (1961).
151. This is a fair statement even though a power-aggrandizing agency, backed up
by a plain meaning judge equipped with a dictionary but otherwise working in a linguistic and cultural vacuum, could conclude that each is an automobile that carries
passengers.
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to elucidate. 152 The danger of Chevron is that it invites courts to ignore
the fact that Congress decided some things because it did not decide
everything. 153
Two interpretive questions are thus always left for the court. First,
the court must determine that there has been a delegation. 154 Second, it
must determine the scope of that delegation: "Determination of the extent of authority given to a delegated agency by Congress is not left for
the decision of him in whom authority is vested." 155 Thus, the agency,
armed with this delegated authority, is not free to say that anything is
a water of the United States, an employee, a bank, or a security. The
court must ensure that the agency does not exceed its statutory authority. One implicit "interpretation" within any legislative rule is that the
rule is within the agency's authority. Were this interpretation "binding," an agency would always be able to pick itself up by its own bootstraps and insulate itself from any meaningful judicial review and
hence any need to comply with the statute.
Suppose, for example, that the Army Corps of Engineers was to require a permit for the discharge of fill material into the sands of the
Arizona desert. The Corps cites Chevron and United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 156 and insists that its interpretation of "waters of the United States" 157 is binding. Any court would reject the
Corps' position. The reason why can be put many ways: the intent of
Congress is clear; this is a "pure issue of statutory. construction''; 158 the
152. This hypothetical statute has both a jurisdictional and a substantive ambiguity, further illustrating that there should be no difference between the treatment of the
two under Chevron. I have discussed the jurisdictional ambiguity (what is a passenger
automobile?) in text, but the same point could have been made using the substantive
ambiguity (what is safe?). Nor are these the only two categories. For example, this
statute seems to leave it to the agency to decide whether "safety" should be achieved
through performance standards, technological standards, or merely greater information
disclosure· to consumers. But it does not allow the agency to say that in its view the
market already ensures safe automobiles. The point is that in administering any regulatory scheme an agency must make a huge range of determinations that the statute does
not fully settle regarding the scope, stringency, and type of regulation. Both the rationale underlying Chevron and the dangers of taking it too far are present with regard to
each type of determination.
153. For a specific example, see infra note 195.
154. Montana v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (deferring "to an
agency's interpretation constitutes a judicial determination that Congress has delegated the norm-elaboration function to the agency"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919
(1985).
155. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 616 (1944). ·
156. 474 U.S. 121 (1985); see supra note 143 (describing permit scheme for discharge of fill into waters of United States).
157. 33 u.s.c. § 1344 (1988).
158. For discussion of "pure questions," see infra notes 142-81 and accompanying
text.
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Corps has exceeded the zone of indeterminacy; the Corps has exceeded
its delegated authority; its interpretation is arbitrary, capricious, and
an abuse of discretion; the interpretation is unreasonable or inconsistent
with any conceivable statutory purpose. Whatever the terminology, the
point is the same. The court can say with confidence that Congress did
not require permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material in the
desert. In calling for deference, the Corps is implicitly arguing that
Congress failed to decide when permits are required and left that determination to it. This claim is itself an interpretation of the statute, one
to which the court owes Skidmore deference, but no more.
This idea works in both directions. Suppose the Corps concludes that
the statute unambiguously requires a permit for discharge of fill material in wetlands, that wetlands are, by clear congressional mandate,
"waters of the United States." Suppose further that the cou_rt finds the
statute ambiguous; it could, but need not 1:>e, applied to wetlands. Wetlands had never crossed Congress' collective mind, or had and Congress
decided the Corps should decide whether to include them in the permit
program. Does the statute's ambiguity make the agericy's view that the
statute is not ambiguous binding? Such ari argument would be incoherent. The court concludes that there was a delegation and the determination of whether wetlands are waters, therefore, belongs in step two.
That conclusion, i.e., whether the merits are step one or step two, is
made within step one by definition. 159
Justice Scalia thus is essentially correct that "there is no discernible
line between an agency's exceeding its authority and an agency's exceeding authorized application of its ·authority. To exceed authorized
application is to exceed authority." 160 This means, however, that Chevron's step two applies to neither of these identical twins, not to both.
Congress may have given an agency lots of room or almost none, but
the boundaries are by definition set by Congress and hence for judicial
identifica tion. 161
159. Regarding what a court should do if an agency deemed its hands tied by what
the court considers an ambiguous statute, see infra notes 189-99 and accompanying
text.
160. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354,
381 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). Compare id. at 386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing agency interpretations of statutes confining their jurisdiction are entitled to no
deference).
161. For an argument that allowing the agency to determine the boundaries of the
delegation would violate the separation of powers, see Farina, supra note 4, at 487-88,
497-98. As I read Professor Farina, her position and mine are wholly consistent.
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"Pure Questions" of Statutory Interpretation

Chevron has prompted a simmering dispute over whether an exception to its hands-off approach exists when a court addresses "a pure
question of statutory construction." Writing for the Court in CardozaFonseca, 162 Justice Stevens rejected the agency's plea for Chevron deference. The case presented "a pure question of statutory construction
for the courts to decide ... [e]mploying traditional tools of statutory
construction." 163 Justice Scalia violently protested that this loose talk
was an unprincipled retreat from Chevron. 164 Some lower courts have
since held that the Chevron methodology is inapplicable to "pure questions of statutory interpretation." 165 No such exception exists.
The opinions using this phrase do not define precisely what a "pure
question" is. One possible meaning is that a "pure question" is one that
does not require the development of a factual record or the application
of law to facts, as opposed to a factual question or mixed question of
law and fact. 166 Justice Scalia takes this view, arguing that Chevron
162. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
163. Id. at 446. Justice Brennan has also stated that in "pure question" cases "our
first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using 'traditional tools of statutory
construction.'" NLRB v. United Food &-Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112,
123 (1987) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ.). See Sunstein,
Interpreting, supra note 52, at 447 (arguing that "[c]ourts, not self-interested regulators, should resolve statutory ambiguities involving pure questions of law"). But see
Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 4, at 2096 (permitting deference
"[e]ven in pure questions of law ... unless there is some independent reason for distrusting the agency").
164. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 454-55 (Scalia, J., concurring); see NLRB v.
United Food & .Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 133 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).165. In Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 824 F.2d
108, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the court suggested that even were congressional intent
unclear, it.would not proceed to step two in a "pure question" case. Because it could
easily discern congressional intent in the case before it, however; it had no need to put
that resolution to the test. See also Regular Common Carrier Conference v. United
States, 820 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Adams House Health Care v. Heckler, 817
F.2d 587, 593-94 (9th Cir. 1987); Miree Constr. Corp. v. Dole, 730 F. Supp. 385, 391
n.14 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (stating that court "cannot defer to the agency's decision with
regard to pure questions of law relating to statutory construction," although agency
interpretation may still carry some weight), affd, 930 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1991).
The Supreme Court has denied at least one petition for certiorari directly raising the
question whether step two deference applies in pure question cases. Texas Apparel Co.
v. United States, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990); see 58 U.S.L.W. 3389 (U.S. Dec. 19, 1989)
(summarizing petition).
166. E.g., International Union of United Mine Workers v. Federal Mine Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 840 F.2d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Anthony, supra note 48, at
9, 21. Thus, in Cardoza-Fonseca Justice Stevens distinguished "[t]he narrow legal
question whether the two standards are the same" from the "quite different ... question of interpretation that arises in each case in which the agency is required to apply
either or both standards to a particular set of facts." Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at
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itself was a "pure question" case, since only the "abstract interpretation of the phrase ,'stationary source'" was at issue. 167 The issue in
Cardoza-Fonseca was undeniably a "pure question of statutory interpretation" in this sense. The Court had to decide whether two phrases
governing suspension of deportation meant t}:le same thing. It did not
have to decide whether the statutory language applied to a particular
alien. Clearly, this question did not turn on or even require reference to
any facts.
Legal issues this "pure," however, are few and far between. Statutory interpretation usually requires some facts, even if they are only
hypothetical. Chevron was not as "purely legal" as Cardoza-Fonseca.
As Justice Scalia points out, it did not involve any factual disputes and
did not turn on the facts. 168 Nonetheless, the dispute arose against the
background of an undisputed set of hypothetical facts involving offsetting in~plant reductions of air pollution. Indeed, to say what a statute
means is to describe its applicability to a particular set of facts. 169 Even
if there were an exception for purely legal issues, such as that in Cardoza-Fonseca, it would be an extraordinarily narrow exception. 170 Finally, the Court often defers in cases involving no factual issues. 171
448.
167. Id. at 455 (Scalia, J., concurring).
168. Id.
169. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448 (observing that ambiguous statute
"can only be given meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication"); Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (stating that "[t]hose who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule"). See also HART, supra
note 150, at 126 (describing how in applying rule to unanticipated facts "we shall have
rendered more determinate our initial aim, and shall incidentally have settled a question as to the meaning ... of a general word").
170. Professor Anthony points to cases concerning who is an "employee" under the
labor laws as other examples of "pure questions." Anthony, supra note 48, at 10 (citing
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947)). The legal issues in these
cases are not that pure; determining whether foremen are employees (the issue in
Packard) obviously requires some factual understanding about what foremen do. Professor Anthony contrasts Packard with NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S.
111 ( 1944) (determining whether newsboys are employees), implying that Hearst did
not involve a purely legal question. Yet, whether foremen are employees turns on the
facts just as much as whether newsboys are employees. The difference is that with
regard to foremen the facts recur more frequently and are better known.
Hearst did raise a threshold legal issue that was truly "pure," like that in CardozaFonseca: whether the common law definition of "employee" controls under the labor
laws. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 120-22. That question can be answered without defining
"employee," just as the Court in Cardoza-Fonseca did not have to establish what the
two phrases at issue meant in order to say that they did not mean. the same thing.
171. For example, Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, _ U.S. - , 111 S.
Ct. 1503 (1991), concerned whether a savings and loan association had realized a loss
when it traded one set of participation interests in mortgages for another set with a
lower face value. The statutory question was whether there had been a "sale or other
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· The issue in Cardoza-Fonseca was "pure" in a second, more relevant
way which better explains the Court's use of that term. It was "pure"
in that Congress provided the answer. 172 The Court did not have to go
beyond the usual legal materials to resolve it. The distinction is not
between issues of law and fact, which does not seem to have much to
do with Chevron. The distinction is between issues of law and policy,
which is at the core of Chevron. Thus, a "pure question" is a Chevron
step one question.
This reading reconciles any tension between Chevron and CardozaFonseca. Both the majority and Justice Scalia agreed that Cardoza~
Fonseca was a step one case. Indeed, where the Court has used the
"pure question" language 173 it has equated the "pure question" with
the "precise question at issue," a term which is in turn taken from
Chevron's description of the step one inquiry. 174 Likewise, the "traditional tools of statutory construction" are what resolve "pure questions" under Cardoza-Fonseca 175 and what decide step one cases under
Chevron. 176
A pure question is, then, a step one case; indeed, defining one by the
other is tautological. There is no "exception" for pure questions of statutory interpretation. In using that phrase, Justices Stevens and Brennan were merely repeating precisely what Chevron says and what has
never been in dispute. Where Congress has decided the issue, its determination, not the agency's, must prevail. This view of "pure questions"
can in fact be seen in more recent opinions. In Dole v. United Steeldisposition of property." 26 U.S.C. § lO0l(a) (1988). Under IRS regulations a realized
loss occurs if there is an "exchange of property for other property differing materially
either in kind or in extent." 26 C.F.R. § 1.1001-1 (1990). The Court upheld the regulation as a "reasonable interpretation" of the statute that merited judicial deference.
Cottage Savings, 111 S. Ct. at 1508-09. This was a pure question of law in the sense of
·involving no factual dispute; the Court made no reference to the facts of this or any
case. Although the opinion did not cite Chevron or use the "pure question" language, it
does belie the usual reading of Cardoza-Fonseca as abjuring deference where no facts
are involved.
172. It is in this sense that Packard is arguably a pure question of statutory interpretation and Hearst is not. The usual way of reconciling these two decisions is that
Packard raised a major issue of labor policy as to which Congress surely held views,
whereas Hearst concerned an interstitial question that Congress probably never
thought about. Anthony, supra note 48, at 10; Breyer, supra note 40, at 371-72. Packard thus presented a "pure" question not in the sense that it did not involve application
of law to facts, but in the sense that Congress had resolved it.
173. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987)
(plurality opinion); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446.
174. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
175. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446.
176. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
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workers, 177 for example, Justice Scalia actually joined an opinion by
Justice Brennan employing the "pure question" language. 178 Similarly,
in Sullivan v. Stroop, 179 the Court found that the statute unambiguously confirmed the agency's interpretation, deciding the case under
Chevron step one and not bothering to invoke the deference principle.
The dissent argued that the statute unambiguously contradicted the
agency's reading and quoted the "pure question" language. 180 Thus, all
the Justices 181 treated this as a step one case. The dissent expressly
equated such cases with "pure questions." There was no squabbling
over whether Chevron applies to such questions. If the dispute over the
pure question exception is ebbing, it is the result of the Justices' shared
understanding that "pure questions" are nothing more or less than step
one questions. They are "purely legal" questions for the courts, as opposed to the policy-based determinations made by agencies where Congress has delegated lawmaking authority. While it is true, then, that a
court must stay in step one when resolving pure questions of law, that
is not an exception to Chevron but a restatement of its holding.
Finally, to return to the themes of this Article, at least one "pure
question" exists in every judicial review of agency action: the court
must determine the scope of the agency's delegated authority. As discussed above, that is a matter that, by definition and at a minimum,
Congress will have established. If when faced with a "pure question of
statutory construction" the court did not defer, notwithstanding the
most confounding ambiguity or the clearest delegation to the agency,
that would indeed be quite an exception. It turns out, however, that
there cannot be a "pure question" in the face of confounding ambiguity
or clear delegation.
177. 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
178. Id. at 35.
179. _U.S.-, 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990).
180. Id. at 2508 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181. All but one. Strangely, Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron, wrote a brief
dissent saying that although he did not consider the case to be "quite as clear" as it
was to Justice Blackmun in dissent, "I believe he has the better of the argument." Id.
at 2510. Many would say that describes exactly the situation when Chevron's step two
applies. See Silberman, supra note 48, at 826-27 (cautioning that merely being able to
identify better of two readings does not keep court in step one). Justice Stevens's relation to his most-cited opinion is complicated. In addition to Stroop, compare Young v.
Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 988 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (complaining that "[t]he task of interpreting a statute requires more than merely inventing
an ambiguity and invoking administrative deference"), with Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc.
v. Primary Steel, Inc.,_ U.S._, 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2772, 2779 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of ignoring statutory ambiguity
and failing to follow Chevron).
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Chevron and Chenery

In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 182 the Supreme Court established the fundamental principle of administrative law that a reviewing court can uphold an agency only on the basis of the rationale relied on by the
agency itself. 183 Chevron may undermine this principle. In a step two
case, where the agency is fr~e to do what it wishes, it might seem that
the agency's particular rationale would not matter. In fact, however,
the Chenery rule retains its vitality.

I.

Chenery and Agency Freedom of Movement

One concern underlying the Chenery rule is that to uphold an agency
action on a ground invented by Department of Justice lawyers or the
court itself could lock the agency into a position that it had never in
fact espoused and with which it disagrees. 184 This concern is present
only if the court's ruling results in final and binding conclusions of law.
If the conclusion of the court is, as in Chevron, that the agency was
free to do what it did, but was and is also free to do the opposite, then
the court is not limiting agency options.
If this is the only concern underlying the Chenery rule, a court
should uphold agency action under step two even if its view of the statute differs from the agency's. The agency then can reverse itself if it
wishes. Because in most cases an agency will affirm its prior decision, 185
setting the agency's action aside would only lead to unnecessary delay
and pointless additional procedures. Affirming the action still leaves the
agency completely free to alter its position if it so chooses, so no harm
is done.
Indeed, that agencies need not worry about having their hands tied is
demonstrated by a number of remarkable decisions in which courts
have wriggled out of apparently dispositive contrary precedents by rein182. 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
183. Id. at 87-88.
184. Women Involved in Farm Economics v. Department of Agriculture, 876 F.2d
994, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Colloquy, Developments in Judicial Review with Emphasis on the Concepts of Standing and Deference to the Agency, 4 AoMIN. L.J. 113,
140 (1990) (comment of Judge Stephen Williams).
185. Schuck. and Elliott's data show that judicial reversal of an agency leads to a
"major change" in the agency action forty percent of the time. Schuck & Elliott, supra
note 3, at 1047-49, 1059-60. Even if this figure is correct (most would agree with
Schuck and Elliott that it is surprisingly high), it still means that in 60% of the cases a
reversed agency managed to do what it wanted anyway. That figure would be much
higher in a subclass of cases where the agency was told that it could do just what it
did, it need only say "we choose to" rather than "we have to."
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terpreting them as Chevron step two cases. 186 Chevron's mystical powers are so great as to "alter the meaning of ... decisi<;>ns that were
based on a broader notion of judicial review." 187 Thus, prior decisions
that would seem to bind the agency and raise exactly the danger Chenery guards against are reinterpreted as having accepted the agency's
interpretation as "reasonable," perhaps even the "better" interpretation, but not one compelled by statute and so not one with which it is
stuck. 188 How much freer, then, will agencies be if their position is up186. For example, in Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of
Laborers, 861 F:2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane), the legal question was whether an
employer could repudiate a prehire agreement it had negotiated with a union. The
NLRB had initially ruled that such repudiation was an unfair labor practice, then
switched its position, and finally returned to its original view. During the middle period,
the Supreme Court had upheld the Board's view that unilateral repudiation did not
violate the National Labor Relations Act. The Ninth Circuit had to decide whether the
Supreme Court precedents required that it reject the Board's new position. The majority concluded that the Supreme Court had not independently construed the statute;
rather, it had merely concluded that the Board's interpretation was reasonable and
consistent with the NLRA and accordingly deferred to it. Id. at 1136. The opposite
interpretation was equally reasonable and consistent with the NLRA. Each of the three
dissents took a slightly different tack, but each seemed to view the Supreme Court
decisions as constructrons of the statute and therefore binding.
Other cases where reviewing courts have found that a previous court, unbeknownst to
it, had merely deferred to the agency position as being one of many (including its
opposite) within the zone of indeterminacy, include National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v.
FERC, 900 F.2d 340, 344-45 (D.C. Cir. 1~90); Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Federal Mine
Safety 4', Health Comm'n, 895 F.2d 773, 777-78 (D.C. Cir. 1990); and NRDC v.
EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
A slightly different problem arises when the pre-Chevron decision rejected the
agency's interpretation. In that setting, the anachronistic reading would treat the precedent as a step one case, thus clearly foreclosing any later shift by the agency. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,_ U.S.-, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992), is an example. The Board
found an employer had committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to allow nonemployee union organizers on its property. The Court held this decision conflicted with
the holding of NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). It refused to
defer treating Babcock & Wilcox as a decision about the meaning of the statute itself.
Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 847-48. In dissent, Justices White and Blackmun argued that
even if the majority's understanding of the rule announced in Babcock & Wilcox was
correct, which they denied, that decision was_ inconsistent with modern principles of
deference. The statute did not answer the question, so the Court should have deferred-both in Babcock and in Lechmere. Id. at 850, 852-53.
187. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Comm'n, 895 F.2d
773, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
188. Twice recently the Supreme Court rejected agency interpretations that conflicted with previous interpretations upheld in pre-Chevron decisions. Maislin Indus.,
U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc.,_ U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2768 (1990); California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490 (1990). These decisions do not state that the later, invalid
interpretation was within the zone of indeterminacy that would have existed but for the
prior ruling. Rather, they strike down interpretations as being simply inconsistent with
the statute. See also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, _ U.S. - , 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992)
(rejecting agency interpretation consistent with previous interpretation rejected in preChevron decision).
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held under step two and with a citation to Chevron?

2.

Chenery' s Continued Importance

Notwithstanding the foregoing, if an agency considers its interpretation compelled, and the court concludes that it is merely permissible,
the court should remand, not affirm. Even though the court's decision
will not tie the agency's hands, the agency must rethink its decision in
light of its actual freedol]l of movement.
The point is illustrated by a recent case arising under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 189 RCRA requires federal
agencies to buy recycled products. 190 This obligation is triggered when
EPA designates a product that is available in recycled form and issues
regulations to guide federal agencies in procuring it. 191 Agencies need
not purchase designated recycled products if they are available "only at
an unreasonable price." 192 EPA's guidelines for recycled paper products define "unreasonable" as anything more than the price for comparable virgin paper. 193
In National Recycling Coalition, Inc. v. Reilly, 194 a coalition of recyclers and an environmental organization unsuccessfully challenged
this definition of "unreasonable price." The court's analysis was pure
Chevron. Congress entrusted RCRA's administration to EPA; "unreasonable" is an inherently ambiguous term; the language, structure, and
history -of the RCRA are not completely dispositive as to its meaning;
therefore, because EPA's reading is "consistent with the Act's overall
purpose," the court must "accede" to it. 195 The complication is that
189. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
190. Id. § 6962(c)(l). Congress reasoned that by purchasing recycled products the
government would both lead by example and stimulate the market for recovered. materials. H. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6289; S. REP. No. 988, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1976).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 6962(e) (1988).
192. Id.
193. 40 C.F.R. § 250.21 (1991).
194. 884 F.2d 1431, reh'g denied, 890 F.2d 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The author was
counsel for one of the petitioners.
195. Id. at 1435-37. The court's approach illustrates the threat that a court will
find utter ambiguity where the statute in fact provides some guidance. Accepting that
Congress left it to the agency to flesh out exactly what constituted an "unreasonable"
price does not mean that this is a step two case, plain and simple. That the term will
support many readings does not mean that it will support any. A court is singularly illequipped to say whether a price of fifty cents per ream more for recycled than virgin
paper is "unreasonable," but the term is not devoid of judicially interpretable meaning.
The question before the court was not the meaning of the phrase "unreasonable price,"
but whether Congress at least meant it to include some price premium over the lowestpriced virgin paper. As Judge Wald wrote in dissent, "the case really turns on the
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although the court treated this as a step two case, the agency saw it as
a step one case. EPA did not think that it was filling an explicit or
implicit gap; it thought that it was interpreting a statutory term consistent with Congress' actual determination of the point at issue. EPA
declined to endorse price preferences in its guidelines on the ground
that it thought Congress had foreclosed that option; "RCRA Section
6002 does not provide explicit authority to EPA to authorize or recommend payment of a price preference." 196
The basic premise of Chevron loses all validity if the court goes to
step two where the agency stopped at step one. Had EPA known, for
example, that Congress had left it room either to endorse or reject a
price preference, as the court held, it might not have written the same
rule. The reason EPA actually gave for not endorsing a price preference is that Congress had forbidden it. EPA considered the scope of its
authority narrower than the court did. Where the agency purported to
find statutory clarity, the court found ambiguity. It is sjlly to "defer" to
the agency's concl:usion when its premise has been rejected. 197 Indeed,
narrower question of whether Congress intended to authorize the [EPA] ... to recommend that federal procurement agencies ... p~rsue a strategy that involves never paying any premium over the lowest bid price for such items." Id. at 1438 (Wald, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). That narrower question is a step one, judicial inquiry
notwithstanding the ambiguity of the term "unreasonable." The Supreme Court, in an
unrelated case, has since confirmed that the National Recycling Coah'tion court's approach was mistaken. It quite .correctly refused to hide behind Chevron in setting aside
the Interstate Commerce Commission's view of an "unreasonable practice." Maislin
Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., _ U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990); id. at
2771 (Scalia, J., concurring). The issue is also comparable to that in Cardoza-Fonseca.
There the Court acknowledged that, for example, fleshing out the meaning of "wellfounded fear of persecution" in concrete cases against specific facts would involve
agency discretion and place a case within step two. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 448 (1987). That did not mean that any interpretive question about the statutory
term is left to the agency. The Court could independently decide whether Congress
meant to equate a ''well-founded fear of persecution," 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(42) (1988),
with proof that it was "more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution," INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). Even with a highly ambiguous term, then,
the Court must determine what it "cannot mean, and some of what it must mean."
Monaghan, supra note 48, at 27;
196. EPA, Guideline for Recovered Material Content in Paper Products Procured
by the Federal Government, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,559 (1989). See 50 Fed. Reg. 14,080
(1985). One might argue that EPA did not actually see its hands as tied but was
merely swayed by the lack of "explicit authority." I do not think this is the case, but
even ifit were, the general proposition remains unchanged and this decision just becomes a weak illustration.
197. The District of Columbia Circuit is in good company. The Supreme Court
seemed to do the same thing in Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 276 (1982). In other
cases, the District of Columbia Circuit has correctly remanded where the agency's rationale was that its hands were tied and the court disagreed. See, e.g., American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Kamargo Corp. v. FERC, 852
F.2d 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. ICC, 826 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir.
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absent express delegation of interpretive authority, whenever an agency
says, explicitly or implicitly, "we think Congress intended ... ," its
conclusion must be reviewed under step one. What Congress intended
is a question for the courts. It may be that the agency is wrong, and
Congress had no intent, but that is for the court to decide. This is not
just a point about the different players' proper roles. This approach is
necessary to keep the agency honest. Especially given the accountability rationale of Chevron, an agency should not be able to hide from its
critics by saying that its hands are tied when they are not.
Where an agency underestimates its freedom of movement, the
proper relief is to remand to the agency, not to uphold the agency action. This reflects not only standard principles of administrative law
settled since Chenery, 198 which was itself a case of this sort, 199 but also
the basic theory of Chevron, which is that agencies should be left free
to make policy determinations where Congress has not. Chevron's distinction between step one and step two situations thus confirms the importance of upholding an agency only on the basis of its. articulated
rationale. The court should allow, or force, the agency to operate with
the flexibility and responsiveness that, under Chevron, are its strengths.

D.

A Different Metaphor for Agency "Interpretations"

Justice Stevens' opinion in Chevron speaks of agencies "filling gaps"
left by Congress. 200 Although this is the dominant metaphor, it is misleading. It implies that agencies complete a line only partly sketched by
Congress. But agencies do not operate on the same horizontal plane as
Congress. A better metaphor would be vertical rather than horizontal
and so capture the role of agencies in adding specificity to the generalized statements of Congress. One possibility is the scheme of biological
classification. In its broadest enactments, Congress has identified the
1987).
198. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87-88, 95 (1943); see International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Judge Wald's dissent makes this point: "[E]ven if Congress did not compel the EPA
to recommend that procurement agencies be allowed to give some price preference to
recycled goods, I believe that the agency's mistaken conclusion that Congress forbade
it to do so is itself a sufficient basis on which to overturn the challenged rule." National
Recycling Coalition, Inc. v. Reilly, 884 F.2d 1431, 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Wald, J.,
dissenting).
199. In Chenery, the SEC initially based its decision on its reading of judicial precedent. The Court held that the SEC had misread the cases, which did not in fact
condemn the stock purchases rejected by the SEC. The Court remanded for the agency
to have another crack at the case, now fully informed as to its freedom of movement.
Chenery, 318 U.S. at 87-88.
200. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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kingdom and nothing else. Congress occasionally gets down to the species level, 201 but that task is generally left for agencies. Under this metaphor, the courts' role is to ensure that as the agency becomes more
specific it remains within the larger boundaries established by
Congress.
Consider Chevron in this regard. Congress imposed stringent requirements on new sources in dirty-air areas but left room for arguing about
what counted as a new source. As Justice Stevens states, the difficulty
was that Congress had not balanced the conflicting interests "at the
level of specificity presented by this case." 202 What is often overlooked
is that even if Congress had legislated at "the level of specificity
presented by this case" there still would have been another case in
which further refinement was necessaty. Suppose the statute had stated
that new source requirements "shall not apply to any new, discrete
emissions unit from which do not exceed prior reductions from another
discrete emissions unit within the same plant or facility." That is the
bubble policy as approved in Chevron. Yet it leaves numerous questions
at the next level of specificity. How recent must the compensating reductions have been? Must they have been of the same pollutant? The
same or a more dangerous pollutant? What sort of geographical, physical, or business link must there be for the bubbling sources to be part
of the same "plant or facility?" Can prior reductions offset new emissions if the reductions were legally mandated? The •answers to these
questions are critical to the actual implementation of the bubble policy,
and EPA's regulations do address them. 203 But the questions do not
indicate "gaps" in the hypothetical statutory language. Rather, they
reflect increasingly specific questions of a sort inescapable in the application of any. statutory provisions.
The advantage of the metaphor of biological classification is that it
reminds us of the. respective roles of Congress, courts, and agencies.
The gap-filling metaphor implies that because Congress has said nothing, i.e., left a gap, the agency must make the decision, and there is
little for a court to do other than to make sure th,e agency is not being
irrational. It also suggests that the agency can reach whatever Con201. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat.
2399 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 2399.
202. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
203. For example, any reduction in the prior five years counts against new emissions. 40 C.F.R. § 52.24(f)(6)(ii)(a) (1991). The Court might be surprised that the
bubble policy, which in most descriptions involves essentially simultaneous offsetting
reductions and increases, is applied so loosely. Yet under Chevron the five-year rule
would be hard to attack, even under the hypothetical statutory language set out in text.
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gress has left alon~. The biological classification metaphor, in contrast,
implies that Congress always has said something and reminds us that
an agency ca,nnot reach what Congress has not. The statute may identify only the broadest outlines, but it always limits the agency's authority to some extent. The role of the court is to ensure that as the agency
spells things out with increasing specificity it stays within the boundaries established by Congress.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Chevron is generally perceived as a "landmark" 204 or "watershed"
decision 205 that "was intended to be a sea change in the way the courts
reviewed agency decisions." 206 The decision would indeed be a
landmark if it required courts to abandon to administrative agencies
their traditional task of interpreting statutes. On the contrary, the author suggests that Chevron's modest, citation-laden opinion is consistent with the rather less· dramatic import of its holding. Chevron
merely refines longstanding principles most evident in the distinction
between standards for judicial review of interpretive and legislative
rules. An agency's view as to what Congres~ meant is entitled to Skidmore deference, but no more. An agency's decision within the sphere of
delegated authority binds the courts. Congress never implicitly delegates the authority to make binding determinations of what Congress
had ip. mind; that interpretive task remains for the courts. Congress
does and can delegate the authority to make binding rules where it has
not made them. That legislative task must be left to the agencies.
The objection to this scheme is, of course, that distinguishing legislation from interpretation is impossible. Undeniably, any "interpretation"
of a statute that goes beyond a literal repetition of its terms is a sort of
legislative undertaking. This is to some extent a problem for a different
article, and more a law professor's pr.oblem than a judge's problem, as
shown by the continued vitality of the arguably meaningless distinction
between legislative and interpretive rules. 207 But even accepting the va204. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 3, at 1023; Silberman, supra note 48, at 822.
205. Starr, supra note 4, at 283.
206. Colloquy, supra note 184, at 139 (comment of Cornish Hitchcock).
207. The overlap of interpretation and legislation is clear but also irrelevant where
Congress expressly gives an agency binding interpretive authority. See supra notes 2628, 123 and accompanying text (stating that when Congress specifically instructs
agency to define statutory term, such rules will be deemed legislative). If Congress
leaves it to the agency to elaborate on the meaning of a statutory term, the line between interpretation and lawmaking is extremely fine and perhaps nonexistent. The
express delegation places these situations in step two, however, so the haziness of the
distinction does not matter.
·
·
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lidity of this objection, courts must to the fullest extent possible search
for and implement statutory meanings. To the extent Congress has
made a decision or even just pointed the way, its decision must be
respected, and it is the courts' role to ensure that it is. Interpretation,
that is, figuring out what it is Congress said-even if it is merely that
the agency is to decide-is always up to the judiciary.
The Chevron controversy parallels the debate over when, and to what
extent, judicial review of agency action is precluded because the decision has been committed to agency discretion. 208 This exception to the
general rule that review is available applies only when there is "no law
to apply. " 209 A Chevron step two case is, in a sense, one in which there
is "no law to apply." Yet the courts have by and large been careful to
keep the committed-to-agency-discretion exception confined to narrow
bounds. Even where a decision is largely discretionary, there is still in
many respects "law to apply"-the decision may be arbitrary, unconstitutional, procedurally defective, and so on. 210 The court must be
careful to determine just what has been committed to agency discretion. Similarly, in interpreting statutes, the court must not assume that
the entire interpretive task has been handed over to the agency. Rather,
it must make a searching inquiry into the boundaries of agency discretion and delegated authority. The court must enforce and adhere to all
the law there is to apply.

208. 5 U.S.C. § 70l(a)(2) (1988).
209. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 401 (1971).
210. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Review of Agency Inaction after Heckler v.
Chaney, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 653 (1985) (insisting that notwithstanding Supreme
Court's presumption against reviewability of agency nonenforcement decisions there remain numerous grounds for judicial review of agency inaction).

